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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, DNA testing of American prisoners has led to revelations that a great many citizens are wrongly convicted by the criminal
courts of this country every year.' At this very moment, the statistics
suggest that thousands of Americans, most of them indigent, and many of
them black, face serious
prison time or even death sentences for crimes that
2
they did not commit.

At the same time that awareness of wrongful convictions has grown,
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 19963 has

1. The Innocence Project proclaims that 156 wrongfully convicted defendants
have been exonerated by DNA evidence thus far. Innocence Project Web Site at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). See also Brett Barrouquerre,
Number of wrongful convictions in La. immense, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, November 23,
2003, at I (reporting that wrongful convictions are being uncovered in ever greater numbers
in recent years and stating, "Nationally, there have been about 700 people freed from prison
in the last 25 years after judges found them wrongfully convicted.").
2.
See C. RONALD HuFF, ET. AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POuCY 10- 11, 55-62 (1996) (taking a conservative approach by
surveying mostly prosecutors and law enforcement officials in Ohio's criminal justice
system (rather than public defenders), but nonetheless estimating in the range of 10,000
wrongful convictions each year in the United States, based upon an error rate of 0.5 percent
applied to a total of 1.9 million annual FBI index convictions).
Summing up the inequitable effect of our criminal justice system on the young
black population of this country, one attorney has remarked:
In the Innocence Project's latest study of wrongful convictions uncovered by DNA analysis, 36% of the wrongful convictions derived from
Whites misidentifying Blacks ....

The startlingly elevated rates of in-

carceration for Black adolescents could indicate that throwing a young
Black life away is perceived to be less likely to be a mistake or that the
mistake matters less than it might with a White adolescent. Providing
inadequate defense counsel and investigative services to indigent Black
defendants, incarcerating the young Black male population at a lavish
rate for exaggerated terms, imposing a draconian system of mandatory
minimum drug sentences with disparate impact on Blacks, executing
Black murderers of Whites at a rate 13 times the rate of White murderers of Black victims-all of these inequities continue to mount long after claw-and-fang racism in the Ku Klux Klan style has gone out of
fashion.
James M. Doyle, Discounting the Error Costs: Cross-RacialFalse Alarms in the Culture of
Contemporary Criminal Justice, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAw 253, 253-54 (2001)
(citations omitted).
3.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996).
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steadily worked to limit the habeas corpus rights of state prisoners who
seek to appeal their convictions in federal courts.4 Perhaps because the
public and press have been focused on the subsequent passage and
ramifications of the 2001 Patriot Act,5 and because the amended habeas
statute of the AEDPA ostensibly impacts on the appeals of convicted
criminals rather than on the lives of "ordinary" Americans, the great effect
the amended habeas act has had on civil rights has not received much
attention outside legal circles.6
Nonetheless, the vast majority of criminal convictions in this country
occur at state trials in which defendants are represented by appointed
counsel who, overworked and underfunded as they are, may not be
equipped to adequately defend their clients. Federal habeas review, long

4.

As the situation has been characterized by one legal scholar:
At the same time that Congress was curtailing the ability of federal
courts to review a state prisoner's conviction and sentence, a number of
organizations-such as the American Bar Association-and governmental leaders-including former governors of Illinois and Marylandwere raising significant concerns about the process by which states impose the death penalty. Among the concerns is the disquieting evidence
that there are the number of innocent people who until recently were
awaiting execution on death row in a number of different states; the
likelihood that there remain innocent people on death row; chilling accounts of incompetent, drunk, or sleeping counsel "representing" individuals charged with capital murder; and mounting evidence regarding
the racial disparity involved in the way the death penalty is administered.
Lyn S. Entzeroth, Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences, Where Are We Now?: A
Review of Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 39 TULSA L. REv. 49, 53 (2003)
(citations omitted).
5.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
6.
As one measure of the comparative attention paid to the two Acts, a February
16, 2005 Google search on the words "Patriot Act" produced roughly 2,510,000 results,
while the words "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act" produced just 41,000
results. (The acronym "AEDPA" produced 37,700 results).
7.
See Stacey L. Reed, A Look Back at Gideon v. Wainwright After Forty Years:
An Examination of the Illusory Right to Counsel, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 47, 60-61 (2003)
(discussing how underpaid and underfunded public defenders tend to encourage defendants
with weaker cases to plead guilty so that the defenders can focus on stronger cases, and how
upon meeting certain clients just prior to trial, if public defenders "cannot convince the
client to plead guilty, they will then struggle through a short trial that they are not fully
prepared to conduct"). As an indication of the widespread nature of this problem, a May 6,
2004 Westlaw search on the key words, "overworked" and "public defender" (within the
same paragraph) applied to the "all state and federal cases" database produced 82 results,
including numerous cases in which defendants made this assertion as a part of an
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considered a safeguard against inequities and irregularities occurring at the
state level, has largely been eviscerated by the AEDPA and the Supreme
Court's cases interpreting that Act. 8 Should an "ordinary" American be
wrongly convicted in a state criminal trial and exhaust his state appeals, he
may find that his claims of constitutional violations will likely receive
minimal additional consideration in a federal court adhering to the AEDPA.
This article focuses on the intersection of the AEDPA with two discrete areas of criminal trial procedure-waiver of the right to counsel at
trial, and prosecutorial introduction of perjury at trial. The article discusses
how the AEDPA has affected Second Circuit defendants' rights in these
areas by dictating the outcome in two important Second Circuit cases,
Dallio v. Spitzer9 and Drake v. Portuondo.10
Through a review of these two recent decisions, the author points to
how § 2254 of the AEDPA amended habeas statute often leads to formalistic, sometimes undisciplined analyses that turn away from the crucial
question that should be at the heart of the habeas inquiry-whether or not
the defendant was accorded a fair trial under our nation's Constitution.
Additionally, the Dallio and Drake opinions provide examples of how
habeas decisions under the AEDPA, though often addressing crucial areas
of well-established constitutional law, tend to be devoid of any policy
discussion or consideration of precedential effects. 1 Like Frankenstein
ineffectiveness of counsel claim. The same key word search applied to the "journals and
law reviews" database produced 149 documents, many of them articles comprehensively
discussing the scope of this problem.

8.
See .MARTIN GARus, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 58 (2002) (stating that the new habeas regime has "set a high

bar for state inmates seeking judicial review of murder cases as well as all other criminal
cases in the federal courts. Since nearly all murder cases that come before the Court began
with state convictions, by nearly totally cutting that pipeline, the Supreme Court ensures that
its previous rulings go unchallenged, and the circle is completed.").
9.
343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003).
10.
321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2003).
11.
See Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas
Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 535, 539 (1999), in which
Chen describes post-AEDPA habeas adjudications as follows:
[H]andcuffed by [the AEDPA's] deferential standard of review, federal
courts adjudicating habeas corpus claims operate in a world where substantive constitutional law lurks in a hazy background. Section
2254(d)(1) [of the amended habeas statute] requires them to disregard
that law, forbids them to apply it to cases before them, and inhibits their
participation in the law's development by preventing them from articulating reasoned expositions of constitutional principle. Thus, federal
courts offer only the appearance of law, disregarding the reality that law
enforcement officials may violate personal constitutional rights of
criminal suspects and that state court judges may sometimes under-
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monsters, AEDPA cases such as Dallio and Drake take on a life of their
own, erasing long-standing defendants' rights to seek relief from wrongful
state convictions, setting destructive precedents along the way that may
impact state and federal jurisprudence beyond the boundaries of habeas
law.
Finally, Dallio and Drake provide examples of how habeas review
under the AEDPA inexorably leads to a bifurcated system of constitutional
rights. These two cases show how, with each passing year, the AEDPA
ensures that state and federal defendants will receive different levels of
protection in various areas of criminal procedure. Sadly, the amended
AEDPA statute over its eight-year life has demolished much of the national
uniformity of constitutional protections
established by federal courts over
2
decades of habeas jurisprudence.
The author has chosen to focus on Second Circuit AEDPA cases because, while generally known as a "liberal" court,' 3 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals oversees the four judicial districts of New York, with
their tremendous caseload of habeas appeals arising from state criminal
convictions,14 many of them for the most serious felonies. 15 Thus, the

Id.

enforce federal constitutional rights in the often emotionally-charged
context of criminal law.

12.
See id. at 535-39. The author, Chen, employs the metaphor of "shadow ball,"
used by some sports commentators to describe the Negro baseball leagues' relationship to
Major League Baseball, to characterize a parallel system of federal and state adjudications
under the AEDPA:
In several contexts, the law establishes parallel, but segregated, arenas
for resolution of important federal constitutional questions. It prohibits
or inhibits individuals from pursuing federal adjudication of claims that
government officials have violated their constitutional rights because
specified (but often speculative) social costs outweigh the benefits of
perfect constitutional enforcement ... It ensures that state court interpretations and applications of the United States Constitution exist in the
shadow of "real" federal law, substantive constitutional doctrine that is
developed and articulated by federal courts in a procedural context that
allows enforcement of those rights.
Id.
13.
See Tania Cruz, Comment, Scrutiny of National Security, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 129, 151 (Fall/Winter 2003) (calling the Second Circuit "one of the more liberal
circuits in the country" and theorizing that the executive branch sought to remove Jose
Padilla from the Second Circuit's jurisdiction to the conservative Fourth Circuit's
jurisdiction in order to sustain its denial of Padilla's right to counsel under the "enemy
combatant" designation).
14.
See Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992), a pre-AEDPA habeas
case, in which a concurring judge, decrying the lack of judicial economy caused by
remanding issues undecided by the en banc Second Circuit to panels, described the stress on
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Second Circuit may be a prime candidate for severely limiting habeas
appeals, promoting law and order justice, and rolling back defendants'
rights.
Indeed, the Second Circuit, conducting habeas inquiries under the
AEDPA, has already upheld: trial closure during the testimony of
undercover police officers, a procedure commonplace in New York State
and nowhere else; 16 a state court determination that a defendant was not in
custody for the purposes of Mirandaafter the police rode in the ambulance
with the wounded man and questioned him in his hospital room;1 7 and the
"minimal" disguising of a state prosecution witness in sunglasses during
her eyewitness testimony at a murder trial, a procedure heretofore unheard
of in any other jurisdiction.' 8 The author has chosen to examine the Second
Circuit's Dallio and Drake decisions in particular because they are
representative of numerous AEDPA habeas cases which have contributed
to the erosion of standards of conduct for prosecutors and judges in our

the Second Circuit occasioned by an onslaught of appeals:
The demands of our ever-increasing caseload are well known and need
not be recounted here. Suffice it to say, the caseload in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has been trending upward for many years. Over
the past three years alone, the number of cases filed has increased from
2,942 in 1988 to 3,172 in 1989, to 3,424 in 1990, to 3,511 in 1991....
Every member of the Court is aware of the fact that 1992 filings already
are outpacing 1991 filings by a large margin. This is no time to make
extra work for the Court.
Id. at 985 (Miner, J., concurring). See also Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of
Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188,
1190-91 (1974) (discussing Congress' consideration of proposed plans in the
1970s to divide New York State between two circuit courts due to the overwhelming "flood-tide of appellate filings" handled by the Second Circuit).
15.
Though violent crime in New York State declined in the period from 1994 to
2001, the statistics for serious violent crimes in the state are still daunting. In 2001, the most
recent year for which statistics are available, there were a reported 649 murders, 1530 rapes
and 28,202 robberies in New York City alone. New York State Division of Criminal Justice
Services, at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ crimnet/ojsa/crmtrnd01/nyc.htm (last visited
Oct. 17, 2005). In 1998, there were a total of 53,961 felony convictions in New York State.
Id. at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja-98/sec4/iss-conv.htm (last visited
May 4, 2004).
16.
See Sevencan v. Herbert, 342 F.3d 69, 77-78 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding, under
the AEDPA, the exclusion of the public from the courtroom, including the petitioner's wife,
during the testimony of two undercover police officers); See Robin Zeidel, Closing the
Courtroomfor Undercover Police Witnesses: New York Must Adopt a Consistent Standard,
4 J.L. & POL'Y 659, 663 (1996) (noting that courtroom closure to protect the identity of
undercover police officers is "strictly a New York phenomenon").
17.
See Gren v. Greiner, 89 F. App'x 754, 756 (2d. Cir. 2004) (noting that the court
"might reach a different conclusion if the question were presented.., on direct appeal").
18.
Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2002).
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nation's courts-both in the manner trials are adjudicated, and in the way
they are subsequently reviewed.
Section II of this article provides background on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus and the judicial history leading up to the passage of the AEDPA.
Section III discusses the most significant addition made to the Habeas
Corpus Act by passage of the AEDPA-subsection 2254(d)-and
illuminates key provisions of 2254(d) as interpreted by the Second Circuit
in light of the Supreme Court's 2000 Williams v. Taylor'9 decision.
Further analysis shows how these provisions have functioned in certain
Second Circuit cases.
Section IV provides background on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the law of attorney waiver at trial, then reviews the Second
Circuit's recent decision in Dallio v. Spitzer,2 ° which the author sees as a
precedent contributing to judicial laxity in the administration of state trials
and an erosion of legal protections for state defendants.
Section V provides background on the law of wrongful conviction by
state-introduced perjury, followed by an analysis of Drake v. Portuondo,2'
a precedent which signals increased judicial tolerance for the use of
perjured testimony as a tool to convict defendants. As an example of the
effect Drake is likely to have in the Second Circuit, the section ends with a
brief review of Grant v. Ricks,22 a Second Circuit district court habeas case
involving state-introduced perjury, which follows Drake.
The author concludes that an examination of cases like Dallio and
Drake shows that the Writ of Habeas Corpus-once rightfully called the
"Great Writ"-under the AEDPA no longer assures a petitioner a meaningful review on the constitutionality of his imprisonment. Rather, the Habeas
Act as amended by the AEDPA has become a tool for undoing venerable
habeas law and well-reasoned constitutional precedents established in the
federal circuits' pre-AEDPA cases.
IX. BACKGROUND-THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AEDPA

The writ of habeas corpus, by which a prisoner can challenge the le,,23
gality of his imprisonment, "is of immemorial antiquity.
Though its

19.
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
20.
343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003).
21.
321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2003).
22.
Nos. 00-CV-6861 JBW, 03-MISC-0066 JBW, 2003 WL 21847238 (E.D.N.Y.
July 29, 2003).
23.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 53, at 350 (5th ed.
1994).
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roots reach back still further, the writ's place in English law was secured by
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.24 Since that time, habeas corpus has come
to be known as "the most important writ known to the constitutional law of
England ...
and "a cornerstone of [American] democracy. 26 As such,
the United States Constitution assures that "[tihe privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or
27
invasion the public safety may require it."
The proper role for habeas corpus in the bifurcated state/federal
American system of justice since the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act in
186728 has long been a matter of debate. In the years leading up to the
passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the
AEDPA), disagreement over the writ's purpose and scope intensified.
On one end of the spectrum were those who argued that the history of
habeas corpus in American jurisprudence supported a widening of the
federal writ toward adoption of what has been called a "full-review
model. 29 On the other end of the spectrum were those who read jurisprudential history to support adoption of an "institutional competence
model. 3 °
32
The "full-review model," which from 195331 until the mid-1970s
"was in acknowledged ascendancy, '33 advocates federal de novo review of
all federal constitutional claims properly raised and preserved by a
petitioner convicted in state court. 34 The policy and principles advanced in

609).

24.
25.

Id.
Id. (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603,

26.
GARBUS, supra note 8, at 57.
27.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
28.
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
29.
Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575, 577 (1993).
30. Id.
31.
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Allen, in which the Supreme
Court concluded that a federal habeas court could hear the constitutional claims of a
petitioner even if the claims were fully considered and adjudicated at the state level. Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953).
32.
The expansion of habeas review under the Warren Court came to an end with
the advent of the Burger Court, which "in a series of decisions in the 1970s ... narrowed the
range of claims that [could] be raised in habeas petitions by defendants who pleaded guilty,
barred consideration of claims that were not properly raised before the state court, and
barred Fourth Amendment claims already litigated in state courts." Comment, Rachel
Myers, Mixed Questions and the Scope of Federal Habeas Review: Consideration of
Miranda Claims in Thompson v. Keohane, 24 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 803, 811 (Spring
1997).
33.
Woolhandler, supra note 29 at 577.
34.
Id.
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support of this view include: protection of constitutional rights such as the
liberty interest; 35 reliance on the superiority of federal courts in deciding
issues of federal constitutional law; 36 "the importance of federal court,
appellate style review of constitutional questions given the impracticality of
Supreme Court direct review"; 37 as well as the capacity to "address the
internal biases, overlapping
of functions, and misconduct which may occur
38
within a state system.,
By contrast, the "institutional competence model" provides that as
long as a convicted defendant had a "full and fair opportunity" to contest
constitutional issues of federal law in state court, in most cases a federal
court would be precluded from reconsidering that prisoner's claims on
habeas review.39 Policies cited in support of this view include: protecting
"the State's significant interest in repose for concluded litigation" 40 as well
4
as preserving the State's capacity to punish certain deserving offenders; '

conserving limited judicial resources; 42 and encouraging federalist
principles of reduced friction and enhanced comity between state and
federal governments.43
In 1992, in Wright v. West, a divided Supreme Court clashed over
both the history of habeas corpus in American constitutional law and the
proper scope of the writ in future adjudications. While the Court unanimously agreed that there was "sufficient evidence to support [the instant
petitioner's] conviction," 44 and that his application for a writ of habeas
corpus should be denied,45 Justice Thomas's opinion advocating a highly
deferential standard of habeas review was joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.46 Of the six remaining Justices, Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and

35.
Id. at 578.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 578-79.
38.
Chris Hutton, The "New" FederalHabeas: Implicationsfor State Standards of
Review, 40 S.D. L. REv. 442, 452 n.66 (1995).
39.
Woolhandler, supra note 29 at 577.
40.
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 293 (1992) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492
U.S. 195, 210 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 282
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))).
41.
Id.
42.
Woolhandler, supra note 29 at 579.
43.
Id.
44.
West, 505 U.S. at 297.
45.
Id.; id. (White, J., concurring); id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 310
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. (Souter, J., concurring).
46.
Id. at 291.
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Stevens, comprehensively attacking Justice Thomas's position,4 7 while
Justices White, Kennedy, and Souter wrote separate concurring opinions.48
Though the conservative wing of the Court ultimately admitted that
the Court did not need to decide the "far-reaching issues" of what standard
of habeas review should apply, 49 Justice Thomas's opinion clearly
advanced the petitioner's argument that Teague v. Lane50 effectively
established a deferential standard of habeas review on state determinations
of purely legal questions; that the habeas statute itself mandated that pure
questions of fact decided by state courts be "presumed correct"; and that it
did not make sense that state decisions involving mixed questions of law
and fact should be reviewed de novo rather than being accorded the
"absolute respect" Justice Thomas claimed they received before 1953. 5'
The O'Connor-Blackmun-Stevens opinion disputed Justice Thomas's
characterization of Teague, asserting that Teague established no deferential
standard of review but rather "simply require[d] that a state conviction on
federal habeas be judged according to the law in existence when the
conviction became final. 52 O'Connor's opinion further opined that "a
move away from de novo review of mixed questions of law and fact"
would upset established habeas law and did not have to be decided "in
order to resolve [the] case., 53 Justice Kennedy, in his separate concurring
opinion, agreed with Justice O'Connor that Teague did not establish a
deferential standard for habeas review nor overrule established Supreme
54
Court law dictating de novo review for mixed questions of law and fact.
Thus a plurality in West agreed that de novo habeas review on mixed
questions of law and fact remained the judicially-decided law of the land.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted in her opinion that Congress had
considered establishing a deferential standard of habeas review on

47.
Justice O'Connor offered a nine-point critique, assailing everything from
Justice Thomas's description of pre-1953 habeas law, id. at 297-99 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), to his characterization of various Supreme Court cases shaping the scope and
meaning of the writ, id. at 299-305, to his position that granting weight and respect to state
court decisions was not compatible with de novo review, id. at 305, as well as his failure to
mention that Congress had rejected adopting a deferential habeas corpus standard of review
on numerous occasions. Id.
48.
Id. at 297 (White, J., concurring); id. at 306-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
310-16 (Souter, J., concurring).
49.
Id. at 295.
50.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
51.
West, 505 U.S. at 294.
52.
Id. at 304 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53.
Id. at 305-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
54.
Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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numerous occasions and had rejected such proposals. 5 Perhaps this fact
and "the surprisingly fractured and inconclusive result in West" led at least
one commentator to state, possibly overoptimistically, "that the zeal of
some of the Justices for stripping federal jurisdiction may have reached its
limit."' 56 After the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, however,
the mood in Congress was ripe for change.57
In 1996, after heavy lobbying by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Congress
passed an amended habeas statute as part of the AEDPA.58 For many years
frustrated by the federal appeals process, which he felt allowed prisoners
and their lawyers to stretch out "endless appeals" by way of "frivolous
claims," the Chief Justice scored a remarkable coup, further narrowing the
right of federal habeas appeal beyond what the conservative wing of the
Court had already managed to do in previous cases. 59
After the passage of the AEDPA, the Federal court system, once "the
venue toward which every innocent or guilty defendant looked," 6 was no
longer the safeguard it had formerly been for defendants' rights, guiding
state compliance with federal constitutional law. Federal habeas review in
the nation's district and circuit courts became a forum narrowly circumscribed, severely restricted in its ability to conform state adjudications to
well-established federal interpretations of constitutional law, and "effec-

55.
Id. at 305 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
56. Woolhandler, supra note 29 at 576.
57.
Several bills were passed by Congress in response to terrorism soon after the
Oklahoma City bombing, for example the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act. S. 735,
104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S7857 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (enacted
by the United States Senate on June 7, 1995). On April 24, 1996, roughly a year after the
Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton signed the AEDPA into law. Jennifer A. Beall,
Note, Are We Only Burning Witches?: The Antiterrorismand Effective Death PenaltyAct's
Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 695 (Spring 1998).
GARBUS, supra note 8, at 56-57.
58.
59. See id. at 57 (discussing then Justice Rehnquist's role in authoring Wainwright
v. Sykes in 1977, "which held that federal courts were barred from considering an issue that
was not raised at the appropriate time of the state criminal proceedings," and his authorship,
as Chief Justice, of the Brecht v. Abrahamson 1993 opinion, "which held that for a
conviction to be reversed by a federal court on a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner ha[d]
the burden of showing not only that there were constitutional errors, but that those errors
had a 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'-a
nearly impossible standard to meet."). Garbus further noted that in the view of Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, the Court, by deciding cases such as these, "had already done such
a fine job of curtailing habeas corpus, and could further eviscerate it if it chose to do so, that
Congress should at that point have left a good thing alone." Id.
60.
Id.
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tively . . 6.1 off limits for convicted defendants looking at a state death
sentence."

11I.

THE AMENDED HABEAS STATUTE-SECTION

2254(d)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 substantially amended Title 28 § 2254 of the U.S. Code, entitled "State custody;
remedies in Federal courts." This article primarily concerns § 2254(d), an
entirely new provision added by the AEDPA which now stands at the heart
of the federal habeas inquiry and severely curtails federal courts' power to
review the convictions of state prisoners. Subsection 2254(d) reads in its
entirety:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.62
The following discussion explains how the statutory language of §
2254(d) has been construed and applied by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in light of the Supreme Court's holdings, in particular those
expressed in Williams v. Taylor,63 the most important case interpreting
subsection 2254(d). In accord with how a typical habeas inquiry proceeds,
the statute's key phrases are examined separately in the following order: (1)
"adjudicated on the merits"; (2) "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; (3) "contrary to, or
...unreasonable application of' (clearly established Supreme Court law);

61.
62.
63.

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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and (4) "unreasonable determination of the facts" (derived from the
evidence adduced at the state court proceeding).
Though this article's central concern is with § 2254(d)'s "clearly established" phrase, a discussion of the other key clauses in the subsection
may provide the reader with a better overall understanding of how the
federal habeas inquiry is now structured. Additionally, such discussion
may help demonstrate how the various clauses of § 2254(d), as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, often work together to produce a formalistic, almost
perfunctory habeas review rather than a meaningful adjudication on
whether a state defendant was accorded his rights under the Constitution.
A.

ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS

A federal court conducting habeas review of a state court determination is bound by the highly deferential standard mandated under § 2254 as
long as the petitioner's claim was "adjudicated on the merits," rather than
on procedural grounds. In Sellan v. Kuhlman,64 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that, "[flor the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court
'adjudicate[s]' a state prisoner's federal claim on the merits when it (1)
disposes of the claim 'on the merits,' and (2) reduces its disposition to
judgment., 65 Under this plain, somewhat tautological reading of the
statute, the Sellan court perceived no requirement that the state court
"explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law ' 66
or provide any reasoning behind its determination at all.67 The court
asserted that to read any such requirements into the language of the statute
would be to "ignore a clear Congressional mandate. 6 8
Though the Sellan court opined that it would "ease [the] burden" on
the federal court if the state court provided some reasoning for its decision,69 the court emphasized, "[W]e are determining the reasonableness of
the state court's decision, not grading their papers. 7 ° In support of this
hands-off approach, the court pointed to substantial, but not complete,
agreement among the majority of sister circuits on the issue.71 Additionally,

64.
261 F.3d 303 (2d. Cir. 2001).
65.
Id. at 312.
66. Id. at 311.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 312.
69.
Id. at 312.
70.
Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312 (quoting Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001))
(citation and internal quotations omitted).
71.
Id.
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the court cited the Supreme Court's pre-AEDPA language in Coleman v.
Thompson,72 encouraging state courts to clearly articulate the grounds for
their determinations when addressing a prisoner's federal claims, but
stressing that the Court would not impose a requirement for any particular
language to be used.7 3 As the Second Circuit summed up the import of
Coleman, "[t]he Supreme Court... pointedly instructed us that' 74'we have
no power to tell state courts how they must write their opinions."'
Consistent with its constrained, highly deferential interpretation of the
"adjudicated on the merits" provision, the Second Circuit has held that "a
single sentence reference" to a petitioner's substantive constitutional claim
by a state appellate court was sufficient to indicate that the petitioner's
appeal was rejected on the merits. 75 In another case, the Second Circuit
ruled that even where the state appellate court summarily affirmed the
lower court's ruling without an opinion, AEDPA nonetheless applied. The
court reasoned that the petitioner presented substantive arguments to the
state appellate court and "nothing in the record" gave the Second Circuit
reason to think that the petitioner's constitutional claims were rejected on
anything but substantive grounds.76 Thus, for all intents and purposes, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals presumes that a state court disposed of a
petitioner's federal constitutional claims on the merits unless it has reason
to believe otherwise.
B.

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW

As a matter of logic, in order to determine whether a state court determination "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established [Supreme Court] law," a federal court conducting
habeas review must determine whether the Supreme Court has set forth any
clearly established law regarding the petitioner's particular constitutional
claim, If the court decides that the Supreme Court has not provided any
precedents relating
to the petitioner's claim, the petitioner's claim
77
necessarily fails.

72.
501 U.S. 722 (1991).
73.
Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739).
74.
Id. (quoting Cappellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739)).
75.
Rossney v. Travis, 93 F. App'x 285, 287 (2d Cir. 2004).
76.
Herrera v. Senkowski, 77 F. App'x. 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2003).
77.
See, e.g., Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) discussed infra
notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States" referred only "to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the]
Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. 78 The
court, however, provided no guidance as to how narrowly or broadly the
circuit courts should define dictum, or how holdings, in contrast to dictum,
should be identified.
The Second Circuit has not, to date, engaged in much discussion on
the proper definitions of the terms "holding" or "dictum" in the habeas
context. Rather, the court has turned to Black's Law Dictionary in order to
define "holding" as "'[a] court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to
its decision; a principle drawn from such a decision ...;79 and quoted
definitions for "dictum" which can vary across different editions of Black's
and provide a different gloss on the term. For example, in a 2002 habeas
case, the Second Circuit reached back more than twenty years to Black's
1979 Fifth Edition Dictionary which defines "dictum" as "'[An observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause,
concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a
question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily ... essential to its
determination . .. ,,,80 By contrast, the concurrence in Dallio v. Spitzer,
disagreeing with the majority's characterization of a Supreme Court
statement as dictum, 8' cited the 1999 Seventh Edition definition as "'[a]
judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion,
but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential (though it may be considered persuasive).' ' '82 This second,
more current Black's definition would appear to set a higher bar for finding
that language in a given case was dictum, since a court would have to assert
that the statements were actually unnecessary. By contrast, a standard
classifying dictum as something "not necessarily... essential" would seem
to be more inclusive.
Very recently, in conducting a habeas review of a state petitioner's
claim, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York asserted that
the Second Circuit in United States v. Bell, a 1975 decision, "recognized

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2003) (Katzmann, J., concurring)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999)).
Sevencan v. Herbert, 316 F.3d 76, 84 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
80.
DICONARY 408 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text (reviewing Judge Katzmann's
81.
concurrence).
82.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 566 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999)) (emphasis added).
78.
79.
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'that a distinction should be drawn between "obiter dictum," which
constitutes an aside or an unnecessary extension of comments, and
considered or "judicial dictum" . . . to guide the future conduct of inferior
courts. ' ' ' 83 The district court noted that Bell relied on Chief Justice
Marshall's language in Cohens v. Virginia, which suggested that the
potential lack of full consideration given a statement uttered as dictum was
the primary reason for rejecting its use as precedent:
It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with
the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point
is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered
in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bear84
ing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
Though the district court's notion of varying weights to be accorded
different types of dicta is intriguing, it must be noted that Bell was a preAEDPA habeas case. The district court did not point to any recent habeas
decisions by the Second Circuit which contained any similar views.
Although it remains to be seen how the Second Circuit will react to the
district court's language on dicta, the Second Circuit's generally strict
adherence to the dictates of § 2254 makes it unlikely that it would entertain
any form of Supreme Court dicta in reviewing habeas cases. Consequently,
long-established and long relied-upon Supreme Court declarations, set forth
by the Supreme Court precisely for the purpose of guiding future decisions
by the lower courts, will be deemed irrelevant for the purpose of habeas
inquiries in the Second Circuit. In similar fashion, years of jurisprudence
built by the Second Circuit and other circuits upon the foundations of
Supreme Court dicta (or derived from dissenting Supreme Court language)
will continue to be bulldozed by the AEDPA.

83.
Hernandez v. Greiner, 305 F. Supp. 216, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975)).
84.
Id. (quoting Bell, 524 F.2d at 206 n.4 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821))).
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In stark contrast, federal direct appeals jurisprudence relying on Supreme Court dicta stands removed from this destructive process. When
conducting direct appeals of federal prisoners' constitutional claims,
federal circuit courts are free to adopt Supreme Court dicta or at least
accord it great weight. Moreover, circuit courts reviewing direct appeals
from federal convictions are at liberty to employ constitutional standards
established by district and circuit court rulings--even those suggested in
dicta.
A recent Second Circuit case, United States v. Nelson,8 5 demonstrates
this principle. In Nelson, the court adhered to its own "powerful dicta that
[indicated] that [a criminal defendant's] right to an impartial fact finder
might be inherently unwaivable. ' 8, 6 The court maintained that this
language, established in the 1962 Second Circuit habeas case United States
v. Fay,87 "remain[ed] as powerful and relevant today as when it first
issued,, 88 despite the fact that the holding of that case was "superceded by
a new and very different habeas regime. 89
A statement from another direct appeal in a Ninth Circuit search and
seizure case also shows the degree of latitude that a circuit court can
exercise in choosing to follow Supreme Court dicta or not, and the weight
given Supreme Court pronouncements, regardless of their classification as
holdings or dicta:
We do not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court
lightly. Rather, we accord it appropriate deference.... As
we have frequently acknowledged, Supreme Court dicta
"have a weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as
prophecy of what that Court might hold"; accordingly, we
do "not blandly shrug them off because they were not a
holding. ' '90
Thus it happens that the United States now has a system of justice in
which the constitutional protections for a state criminal defendant may be
radically different and significantly diminished from those accorded a

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.

277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 205.
300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
Nelson, 277 F.3d at 205 n.50.
Id.

U.S. v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting)).
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federal defendant.9 1 Numerous Second Circuit habeas opinions since the
passage of the AEDPA make explicit reference to this inconsistency,
stating that the judges in those cases "might well" have found a constitutional violation if they had been ruling on direct appeal.92
Aside from any potential loss of protection from Supreme Court pronouncements classified as dicta, state prisoners seeking a writ of habeas
corpus from the Second Circuit may also find that the way in which their
claims are characterized brands them undeserving of constitutional
protection. That is, although the Supreme Court may have established clear
precedent in regard to the constitutional right the defendant claims was
violated by the state court, if the state succeeds in characterizing the claim
as one to be analyzed under another area of law, as yet undetermined by the
Court, the petitioner will not be accorded protection from the established
precedent.
For example, in Morales v. Artuz,93 the Second Circuit recently held
that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was
not violated by the partial disguising of a state prosecution witness with
dark, eye-concealing sunglasses, after the witness refused to testify against
the defendant without this protection. 94 Though the district court applied
the Supreme Court's established confrontation law in holding that the

91.
A circumstance that accords with the federalistic notions of justice promoted by
the conservative wing of the Court, as articulated by Justice Thomas in Wright v. West:
"Indeed, the notion that different standards should apply on direct and collateral review runs
throughout our recent habeas jurisprudence." West, 505 U.S. at 292.
92.
See, e.g., Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 233 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that a trial
court's admitting of out-of-court statements by witnesses based on "weak evidence" that the
defendant allegedly threatened the witnesses "might well" have constituted a constitutional
violation on de novo review, but "require[d] a different conclusion" under 28 U.S.C. §
2254); Gren, 89 F. App'x at 756 (concluding in a Miranda habeas inquiry that the
interrogation of a state defendant in his hospital room did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights, though the court noted "we might reach a different conclusion if the
question were presented to us on direct appeal"); Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 89 (2d
Cir. 2001) (opining in a right to counsel habeas inquiry that, had the case "been a direct
appeal from a federal conviction," the court "might well have agreed with petitioner" that
his constitutional fights were violated); James v. Walker, No. 99-CV-6191(JBW), 2003 WL
22952861, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2003) (The court noted in this Miranda continuous
interrogation case that, "[w]ere this court permitted to review the case de novo, it might well
find that the initial pre-Miranda confession so tainted the post-Miranda confession as to
make its admission constitutionally suspect. Under AEDPA, however, this court owes
substantial deference to the determinations of the state courts."); Guzman v. Duncan, 74 F.
App'x 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (mentioning that the district court rejected the petitioner's
Batson claim but at the same time that court noted "that its judgment might have been
different if it had reviewed the case de novo").
93.
281 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002).
94.
Id. at 58-59.
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defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the procedure,95 the
Second Circuit held that because the Supreme Court had never spoken on
the issue of witness disguise, it was doubtful the Supreme Court's
confrontation cases applied.9 6
Similarly, in Gilchrist v. O'Keefe,9 7 a habeas petitioner who punched
his appointed attorney in the head, causing the attorney to withdraw from
representing him at sentencing, could not show a constitutional violation
resulting from the trial court's refusal to appoint another attorney for
sentencing proceedings. 98 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals accepted
the state's argument that the Supreme Court's established law on attorney
waiver did not apply in the defendant's case because the defendant had
forfeited, rather than waived, his right to an attorney. 99 The state successfully argued that there was "no Supreme Court precedent deciding the
specific circumstances if any, under which a defendant [might] forfeit the
right to appointed counsel." 1°° As the Second Circuit explained its
decision:
Having thus established that Supreme Court precedent recognizes a distinction between waiver and forfeiture of constitutional rights, and that there is no Supreme Court holding either that an indigent defendant may not forfeit (as
opposed to waive) his right to counsel through misconduct
nor a general Supreme Court holding that a defendant may
not forfeit a constitutional right, we conclude that the state
court rulings were not "contrary to" clearly established
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 10'
The court expressed its discomfiture with its AEDPA habeas determination as follows:
Although, of course, under no circumstances do we condone a defendant's use of violence against his attorney,
had this been a direct appealfrom a federal conviction we

95.
Morales v. Artuz, No. 98CIV.6558(JGK), 2000 WL 1693563, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 13, 2000).
96.
Morales, 281 F.3d at 58-59.
97.
260 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001).
98.
Id. at 89-90.
99.
Id. at 94-95.
100.
Id. at 94.
101.
Id. at 97.
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might well have agreed with petitioner that the constitutional interests protected by the right to counsel prohibit a
finding that a defendant forfeits that right based on a single
incident, where there were no warnings that a loss of counsel could result from such misbehavior, where there was no
evidence that such action was taken to manipulate the court
or delay proceedings, and where it was possible that other
measures short of outright denial of counsel could have
been taken to protect the safety of counsel. Nevertheless,
we cannot say, under the deferential standard applied in
habeas review, that the state courts here acted in a manner
that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
federal law as determined by the Suclearly established
10 2
preme Court.
At the risk of oversimplifying, these last quotes suggest that if a New
York State defendant punches his attorney in the head, he may be denied
counsel for sentencing because the Supreme Court has not spoken precisely
on attorney forfeiture, but if a federal defendant punches his counsel in the
head, he may nonetheless be accorded the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at sentencing. Whether one believes that a client who assaults his
appointed attorney deserves representation at sentencing or not, this
difference in constitutional protection represents an incongruous and
seemingly arbitrary result all too typical under the AEDPA.
CONTRARY TO, OR AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF,
C.
ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT LAW

No portion of the AEDPA has created more controversy or generated
more judicial and scholarly discussion than the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d). Though a divided Supreme
Court in Williams v. Taylor announced its interpretation of these clauses,
this somewhat confusing opinion only sowed division among the circuits.103
Under Williams, as expressed by Justice O'Connor, a state court
decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law if "'the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

102.
103.

Id. at 89-90 (emphasis added).
Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."" 0 4 An "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law occurs after Williams when a state court
"'identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme
Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
[a] prisoner's case."",10 5 Justice O'Connor cautioned in Williams that "a
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
or incor10 6
rectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."'
Interpreting Williams, the Second Circuit in Francis S. v. Stone
expressed some degree of frustration with Justice O'Connor's explanations of the statute's language. The court apparently found Justice
O'Connor's "virtually tautological statement" regarding the "unreasonable application" clause unenlightening, 0 7 stating: "Justice O'Connor
took some comfort in the fact that 'unreasonable' is 'a common term in
the legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its
meaning.' The difficulty, of course, is that we are familiar with its
many meanings in the different contexts in which the word (or its
antonym) is used." 10 8
In response to the confusion created by Williams, the FrancisS. court
provided its own reading on what constituted an "unreasonable application"
in the Second Circuit by stating: "Some increment of incorrectness beyond
error is required. We caution, however, that the increment need not be
great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions 'so
far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence. ' ' 1°9
Regardless of exactly how "contrary to" or "unreasonable application"
are defined in the Second Circuit, it is clear that even if a state prisoner can
identify "clearly established law" that applies to his case, the standard for a
finding that the state court contradicted that law or misapplied that law is
extremely high. It will be the rare case in which the reviewing federal

104.
Hamilton v. Herbert, No. 01 CV 1703(JG), 2004 WL 86413, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 16, 2004) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
105.
Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
106.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 411.
FrancisS., 221 F.3d at 111.
107.
108.
FrancisS., 221 F.3d at 109 n.12 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410).
109.
Id. at 111 (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 889
(3d Cir. 1999)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26

court will find that the state court addressed "a set of materially indistinguishable facts," or came to an "opposite" conclusion from the Supreme
Court on the governing law. Additionally, though it might not be necessary
in the Second Circuit for a prisoner to show that a state judge's interpretation of the constitutional issue was "incompetent" in order to sustain a
claim that the judge misapplied Supreme Court law, a showing that the
judge interpreted the law wrongly will not be sufficient. Thus, working in
combination with the "clearly established" clause of subsection 2254(d)(1),
the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses, as interpreted by
Williams, erect formidable barriers to a habeas petitioner's claims that his
constitutional rights have been violated on the law.
D.

UNREASONABLE DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS

Under § 2254(d)(2), a habeas petitioner may also establish a constitutional violation if he can show that the state's determination of a factual
issue was unreasonable based on the evidence presented at trial. However,
the "unreasonable" requirement under § 2254(d) is governed by the
amended habeas statute's provision § 2254(e)(1) which reads:
(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 110
No doubt, a standard which presumes state courts are correct on factual determinations and requires petitioners to rebut that presumption
through clear and convincing evidence makes it extremely unlikely that in
all but the most egregious cases a petitioner can succeed in challenging his
conviction on factual grounds. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
revisited its habeas corpus jurisprudence in two important death penalty
cases, Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-El v. Cockrell, and taken the rare step of
granting relief. In Miller-El, the Court opined that "'[e]ven in the context
of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of

judicial review. .

.

. A federal court can disagree with a state court's

credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the

110.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).
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decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by
clear and convincing evidence.""" This language signals an apparent shift
in approach by the Court regarding factual review under the AEDPAstrenuously objected to by Justice Thomas in Miller-El,'12 and by Justices
Scalia and Thomas in Wiggins v. Smith" 3-and suggests that the Court

111.
Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (ellipsis in original)
(quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324 (2003)).
112.
In Miller-El, a Batson (racially-motivated peremptory jury strikes) claim, the
Court did not actually decide whether the state's determination on the facts was unreasonable but rather whether the district court improperly denied the petitioner a certificate of
appealability (COA) in a threshold determination whether the circuit court should hear the
petitioner's appeal. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36. The Court held that for a petitioner to
merit a COA under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, in addition to the petitioner having to make a
substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right, he would have to "demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong." Id. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). The
Court held that it would not require the petitioner to meet the "clear and convincing"
standard of § 2254(e)(1), explaining, "[w]e do not require petitioner to prove, before the
issuance of a COA, that some jurists would grant the petition for habeas corpus. Indeed, a
claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has
been granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail."
Id. at 338.
Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's resolution of the law on the COA issue
under § 2253 but reluctantly concurred in the Court's result, calling the decision "a very
close case." Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas declared that, even in a COA determination, § 2254(e)(1)'s
stringent standard should control: "Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) requires that a federal
habeas court 'presum[e]' the state court's findings of fact 'to be correct' unless petitioner
can rebut the presumption 'by clear and convincing evidence.' The majority decides,
without explanation, to ignore § 2254(e)(1)'s explicit command. I cannot." Id. at 354
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
113.
In Wiggins v. Smith, the Court held that the petitioner was denied effective
assistance of counsel by his state-appointed attorneys' failure to expand their search for
mitigating evidence of the petitioner's horrendous childhood experiences beyond the PSI
(pre-sentence investigation) report they already had available to them. 539 U.S. at 522-33.
The court concluded that the petitioner had met the Strickland standard for a showing of
ineffective assistance of counsel by demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id.
at 534 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692). The Court further held that the Maryland Court
of Appeals not only unreasonably applied Strickland, but also partially based its decision
"on an erroneous factual assumption"-that Wiggins' counsel had adequately investigated
his background. Id.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas objected that the Court was "ignoring
§ 2254(e)(1)'s requirement that federal habeas courts respect state-court factual determinations." Id. at 541-42 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia complained, "The
decision sets at naught the statutory scheme we once described as a 'highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings."' Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).
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may be recognizing that, at least in regard to death penalty cases, a more
meaningful review of state adjudications may be in order.
Reaction by news sources such as the Washington Post and New York
Times to the Court's recent habeas decisions was that the Court might be
"opening up habeas corpus review and that greater protection will be
extended to capital defendants who are saddled with incompetent lawyers
or who are subject to racial discrimination during their capital proceed' 14 This may be an overly simplistic
ings.
and optimistic view, however.
As one legal
scholar puts it:
This assessment of the Court's position is debatable. At the
very least, it would be incautious to predict that the
Rehnquist Court is swinging open the federal court doors
to convicted state criminals ....115 The Supreme Court refuses to allow the AEDPA to shut down federal habeas review completely, or simply make it a perfunctory, meaningless step on the road to execution. However, even in
light of Wiggins and Miller-El, federal courts do not provide a safety net under the AEDPA protecting the innocent,
the wrongfully convicted, or the wrongfully sentenced.
While the Supreme Court is signaling the importance of
federal review of death sentences and raising concerns
about the reliability and appropriateness of the death penalty as currently imposed, the Court has not assured that
our federal habeas system will protect those who are
wrongfully16 sentenced to death or those who are actually
innocent.
As a review of the following two Second Circuit cases Dallio and Drake
shows, as long as the current Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence remains
in place, § 2254 determinations will continue to be formalistic exercises
that frustrate individual defendants' attempts to obtain meaningful review
of their convictions. Moreover, cases such as Dallio and Drake signal an
unrestrained and continuing erosion of constitutional protections accorded
defendants in the conduct of their state trials.

114.
Lyn. S. Entzeroth, Federal Habeas Review of Death Sentences, Where Are We
Now?: A Review of Wiggins v. Smith and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 39 TULSA L. REv. 49, 71

(2003).

115.
116.

Id.
Id.at 73.
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IV.

VALID ArrORNEY WAIVER AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
DALuo V. SPI7ZER DECISION

The following section briefly summarizes the Supreme Court's cases
on the right to self-representation at trial as well as the responsibility on the
part of courts to ensure that a defendant's waiver of representation does not
violate the Sixth Amendment. A critical review of the Second Circuit's
recent habeas decision, Dallio v. Spitzer, exposes the highly formalistic yet
undisciplined nature of that case, casts doubt upon its reading of both
Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent, and questions its utter lack of
policy analysis.
A.

ATTORNEY WAIVER

A criminal defendant does not exert complete control over every aspect of his defense. It is generally understood that there are three trial
decisions that are wholly within a criminal defendant's province to make
alone: (1) whether to plead guilty; (2) whether to waive the right to a jury
trial; and (3) whether to testify.1 7 By contrast, a criminal defendant's right
to waive the "assistance of counsel" provided by the Sixth Amendment' 18 is
not absolute because "the government's interest in ensuring the integrity
and efficiency of the trial at
times outweighs the defendant's interest in
9
acting as his own lawyer." 1
The Supreme Court's benchmark attorney waiver case is Johnson v.
Zerbst,120 which sought to delimit the scope of a criminal defendant's right
to waive assistance of counsel and discussed the trial court's responsibility
to assure the constitutional validity of such a waiver. The Supreme Court
established in Johnson that a defendant's waiver of the right to representa'2
tion by an attorney was only proper if it was "intelligent and competent."' 1

117.
State v. Kayer, 984 P.2d 31, 44 (Ariz. 1999).
118.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
119.
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000).
120.
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
121.
Johnson's "intelligent and competent" language was the basis for the
"knowingly and intelligently" language later adopted by the Court. See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835 (misquoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65). Johnson is now cited in
support of a constitutional standard of "knowing and intelligent" waiver. Dallio, 343 F.3d at
561 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65).
In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, rejected the proposition that the standard for competency to waive
representation should be set higher than the competency to stand trial. 509 U.S. at 397. The
Court noted, however, that a determination of a defendant's competence to stand trial was
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to
Additionally, the Court stated that a trial court owed a "protecting duty" 122
the defendant to "clearly determine[]" that the waiver was proper.
Writing generally, the Court stated that "'courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights,"' 23 and
specifically suggested that for a waiver of counsel to be effective, it
"should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and
appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record."' 24
In Carnley v. Cochran,'25 the Supreme Court transformed Johnson's
"fitting and appropriate" suggestion into a mandate. Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan stated, "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record
is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and
evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently
' 26
and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."'
In Von Moltke v. Gillies, Justice Black, writing for four Justices of a
majority of six, extended Johnson's "protecting duty" language, providing
a still more profound view of a judge's responsibility to engage in colloquy
with the defendant when determining the validity of a waiver of counsel at
trial:
To discharge this duty [of assuring the intelligent nature of
the waiver] properly in light of the strong presumption
against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a
judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the
circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact
that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right
to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such
waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of
the charges, the statutory offenses included within them,
not in itself enough to support a valid waiver of the right to counsel: "a trial court must
satisfy itself that the waiver [of] constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. In this
sense, there is a 'heightened' standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to
counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence." 509 U.S. at 400-01. See YALE
KAMISAR Er. AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1099 (10th ed. 2002) (explaining that the Court
made a distinction between the ability to simply understand the nature of the proceedings
inherent in a general competency determination and the higher standard for a "knowing and
voluntary" waiver-that the defendant actually understand the "significance and
consequences" of his decision) (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n. 12).
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
122.
Id. at 464 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
123.
Id. at 465.
124.
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
125.
Id. at 516.
126.
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the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible
defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation
thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an
accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly
and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such
127
a plea is tendered.

Nearly forty years after Johnson's 1938 holding, in Faretta v.
California, 28 the Court considered the waiver issue from another side,
holding that the right to self-representation was implied in the Sixth
Amendment.129 The Court reasoned that the explicit rights enumerated in
the Amendment-for example, "to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation" and "to be confronted with [accusatory] witnesses"-were
130
the defendant's rights, not his counsel's.
The Court cautioned, however, that for a defendant to make a
constitutionally valid waiver of representation he needed to do so
"knowingly and intelligently."' 131 The Court's opinion further declared that
the trial judge should inform the defendant "of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that
' ' ' 32
'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
B.

DALLIO V. SPITZER

Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Johnson, Carnley,
Von Moltke, and Faretta, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held in Dallio v. Spitzer'33 that a state court did not violate a criminal

127.
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 322 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948). Though this language in
Von Moltke was endorsed by a plurality rather than a majority of the Court, in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court's majority opinion cited this passage,
presaging it with the words, "The Court was even more explicit in Von Moltke v. Gillies...
Id. at 244 n.32 (emphasis added).
128.
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
129.
Id. at 819-20.
130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 835. (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65).
132.
Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)).
133.
343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003).
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defendant's constitutional right to counsel by failing to explicitly warn him
134
of the dangers inherent in self-representation at a suppression hearing.
The court concluded that the Supreme Court's statement in Faretta v.
Califomia, "that a defendant waiving his right to counsel 'should be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,' ' ' 135 was
dictum in that case. 136 As a consequence, the Second Circuit ruled that the
Supreme Court's language was not "clearly established law" for the
purposes of federal habeas review on the issue. Accordingly, the court,
under a highly formalistic AEDPA analysis, rejected the petitioner's §
record indicating a complete absence of
2254(d) claim, 137 despite a hearing 138
judge.
trial
the
by
waiver warnings
The circuit court's ruling rejected the reasoning of what it called the
"thoughtful and detailed decision" of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York on the attorney waiver issue, 3 9 in which
the district court concluded that "'[a]lthough... there is no rigid procedure
for advising a defendant about the ramifications of proceeding pro se,
Faretta requires, at a minimum, that there must be an explanation of the
attendant dangers and disadvantages. ' ' 14° Based upon a finding that the
trial court had offered no such warnings, the district court determined that a
constitutional violation had occurred, though it nonetheless deemed the
error harmless and denied the petitioner's § 2254(d) habeas claim.' 4'
While affirming the district court's ultimate denial of the petitioner's
habeas petition, the Second Circuit diplomatically rejected the district
court's holding, drawing a distinction between the rights that might be due
a defendant on original jurisdiction at the federal district court trial level
and those due at the state court level for the purposes of federal habeas
review as follows:

134.
Id. at 561.
135.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 561 (quoting Faretta,422 U.S. at 835).
136.
Id. at 561-62.
137.
Id. at 564-65.
138.
Id. at 556-57. The defendant Dallio was permitted by the judge to proceed pro
se with his lawyer as "stand-by counsel." Though Dallio addressed the court concerning his
reasons for wanting to represent himself, there apparently was no discussion between the
judge and Dallio concerning the dangers of this approach. Id. at 557.
139.
Id. at 558. The petitioner also appealed on the state court's denial of a
suppression motion. The district court found this claim meritless and the Second Circuit
denied appeal, granting a certificate of appealability on the attorney waiver issue only. Id. at
558, 559.
Id. at 558-59 (quoting Dallio v. Spitzer, 170 F.Supp.2d 327, 336 (E.D.N.Y.
140.
2001)).
141.
Dalio, 170 F.Supp.2d at 336-37.
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To the extent [the Second Circuit's] precedent appeared to
send mixed signals, the able district judge concluded that
Farettawarnings were a "minimum" requirement to ensuring a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Such a
cautionary approach to counsel waivers would certainly be
understandable, even laudable, were a district court itself
addressing a criminal defendant intent on proceeding pro
se. But in this case, our focus is only on whether a state
court's contrary ruling
falls within the narrow scope of 28
142
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
In support of its conclusion, the Second Circuit opined that Faretta's
"should be made aware of the dangers" language was "[t]he only Supreme
Court support for [the] proposition" that explicit warnings need be given by
a trial court. 14 3 Moreover, the Second Circuit reasoned that the Faretta
language was dictum because the Sixth Amendment violation addressed by
the Faretta Court concerned state denial of a defendant's right to waive
counsel, not the propriety of the waiver itself.'44 Hence, the court declared
that for the purposes of § 2254(d) review, the Supreme Court's "'general
expressions"' in Faretta might "well merit respect,"'' 45 but were not
"clearly established Federal law . . . [derived from] the holdings, as
46
opposed to the dicta, of [the] Court's decisions."",1
Additionally, the Second Circuit suggested that the Faretta Court's
use of the word "should" rather than "shall" in its statement on waiver
warnings constituted something less than "a clear establishment of a legal
mandate."'' 47 Although the court admitted that in common parlance "the
word 'should' [was] simply the past tense of 'shall,"' it nonetheless opined
that the relative strength of the word was "legally variable,"'' 48 since some
circuit decisions deemed the word compulsory based upon its "'common
interpretation,"",149 while others characterized it as "'permissive rather than

142.

143.

Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563-64 (emphasis added).

Id. at 561.

144.
Id. at 561-62. Specifically, the Faretta Court vacated the judgment of the
California Supreme Court, which had denied review of the California Court of Appeal's
affirmance of a trial court decision denying a defendant's request to represent himself at
trial. Faretta,422 U.S. at 811-12, 836.
145.
Id. at 562 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-402
(1821)).
146.
Id. at 562 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412) (alterations added).
147.
Id. at 562.
148.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 562.
149.
Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 798 F.2d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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mandatory.""1 50 Therefore, reasoned the court, Faretta did not "clearly
establish[] that explicit warnings about the dangers and disadvantages of
constitutional prerequisite to every
self-representation [were] a minimum
' 51
counsel."'
to
right
the
of
waiver
valid
The court characterized its own Second Circuit jurisprudence on
"'knowing and intelligent"' waiver as being a "totality of the circumstances" approach, 152 in which factors such as "'defendant's education,
family, employment history, general conduct, and any other relevant
circumstances"' were to be considered.' 53 While admitting that the Second
Circuit had previously stated that a trial court "'should conduct a full and
calm discussion with defendant during which he is made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, ' ' ' 54 the court stated that
such Faretta warnings were only "strongly endorsed . . . as a factor
important to the knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel," and not a
requirement. 55 The court implied that a requirement of minimum warnings
or scripted procedures" that
would amount to the "rigid waiver formulas
56
rejected.
hitherto
had
Circuit
the Second
The court asserted that its totality of the circumstances methodology
(and by implication disavowal of explicit warnings) found support in "[a]
number of our sister circuits [which] follow a similar approach," citing
compatible statements from a majority of the federal circuit courts. 157 As
will be discussed later in this Article, however, these extracts were
sometimes inaccurate, devoid of essential facts, and as a totality, wholly
misleading if presented for the proposition that a majority of the circuits

Id. (quoting Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1987)). The court
150.
also cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 347 (8th
Cir. 1985) for the proposition that "should" was "a preferential rather than mandatory
word." Dallio, 343 F.3d at 562.
Id. at 564.
151.
152.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 (quoting United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 108 (2d
Cir. 1999).
Id. (quoting Fore, 169 F.3d at 108).
153.
Id. (quoting Fore, 169 F.3d at 108).
154.
See id.
155.
156.
Id. The court, however, offered no citation in support of the notion that
requiring the trial judge to provide some type of warning to the defendant, that is, any type
of warning, was tantamount to imposing a rigid framework on the trial court. Id. On the
contrary, the court quoted its earlier Fore decision for the proposition that 'district courts
are not required to follow aformulaic dialogue with defendants wishing to waive their Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel... ' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fore, 169 F.3d at 107).
At least to this author, the Fore court's statement logically suggests that some minimum of
dialogue should be required.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 n.4.
157.
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had disavowed requiring trial judges to make substantial, perhaps explicit,
waiver warnings
on the record under anything but highly unusual circum58
stances. 1

In a concurring opinion, Judge Katzmann disagreed with the majority
holding, concluding that the trial court had violated the petitioner's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, though like the district court, he deemed the
error harmless. 159 The judge challenged both bases relied upon in the
majority opinion for denying a constitutional violation. 160
First, the judge asserted that the Supreme Court's Farettapronouncements on waiver warnings were not dictum. 161 The judge opined that an
assessment of the defendant Faretta's "knowing and intelligent" waiver of
his right to counsel was integral and essential to the Court's holding that
Faretta's right to self-representation had been violated. 162 In other words,
"[it] was only because Faretta validly waived the right to counsel that the
Court found that the trial court violated his right to counsel by not honoring
that waiver."' 163 Thus Judge Katzmann found it "inescapable" that had the
Supreme Court doubted the quality of Farreta's "knowing" exercise, it
would not have vacated the judgment of the California Supreme Court. 164
Accordingly, the judge asserted that the Faretta Court's statements on
warnings were165
in no way "unnecessary to the decision in the case," but part
of its holding.

Second, Judge Katzmann called into question how the majority
equated a requirement of warnings with a "rigid formula for a colloquy
between the trial judge and the defendant."' 66 While the judge agreed that
Faretta did not mandate any scripted warnings, he nonetheless maintained
that Faretta did require "some basis in the record" that a defendant
had
67
been made aware of the substantial dangers of self-representation.1
Judge Katzmann went on to assert that "[t]he transcripts of the suppression hearing [were] devoid of any indication that [the defendant]
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel," and even further,

158.
See infra notes 175-210 and accompanying text (providing a critical review of
the Dallio court's citation to circuit authority).
159.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 565 (Katzmann, J., concurring).

160.

Id.

164.

Id.

161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 566.
Id.

165.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 566 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 110 (7th ed. 1999)).
166.
Id. at 566-67 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
167.
Id. at 567 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
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that "[n]owhere in the record ... [was] there even a glimmer" confirming
such awareness on the part of the defendant. 168 Though the majority in
answering this characterization pointed to: the defendant's long criminal
history, his knowledge of the importance of an attorney as evidenced by an
earlier motion for reassignment of counsel, his pursuit of a college degree
in prison, his articulateness in presenting to the court his reasons for
proceeding pro se, as well as his detailed conversation with his former
counsel, the majority could
not cite a single word of warning uttered by the
169
judge to the defendant.
Before presenting his ultimate conclusion that the constitutional violation of the defendant's right to counsel was harmless, Judge Katzmann also
voiced his disagreement with the majority that the dangers posed to the
defendant in proceeding pro se were minimal, as the judge put it, "trivial in
this case.,' 170 The judge pointed out that "[s]uppression hearings often
involve complex legal and evidentiary issues unfamiliar to the layperson,"
and that although the dangers of self-representation at a suppression
hearing were perhaps not comparable to proceeding pro se before a jury at
trial, they were nonetheless substantial and could require knowledge of "the
proper evidentiary objections to make and legal arguments and strategies to
advance." 171
Though Judge Katzmann's somewhat deferential concurrence presented a critique of the majority's reasoning, it failed to expose the
precedential, even radical nature of the Dallio decision. In addition, it did
not point out the lack of circuit support for the majority's approach to
attorney waiver determinations.
When the Second Circuit characterized as dictum the FarettaCourt's
discussion on attorney waiver warnings, its highly formalistic, narrow
reading of the law broke new ground-no other circuit court has suggested
that these statements by the Court were dictum. Quite to the contrary,
Faretta's statements on warnings are so well established that the term
"Faretta warnings" is of common usage in the cases, as is the term
"Farettahearing" for a proceeding to determine the propriety of allowing a
defendant to carry on pro se.

168.
Id. (Katzmann, J., concurring).
169.
Id. at 564 n.5.
170.
Id. at 567 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
171.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 567 (Katzmann, J., concurring) On this point, the judge
could well have cited to the Supreme Court's statement in Waller v. Georgia that
"suppression hearings often are as important as the trial itself," 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984),
particularly since "in many cases, the suppression hearing [is] the only trial, because the
defendants thereafter plead[ ] guilty pursuant to a plea bargain." Waller, 467 U.S. at 47.
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Additionally, when the Second Circuit took as its starting point the
proposition that "[t]he only Supreme Court support" for a requirement of
explicit waiver warnings was to be found in Faretta, this was not a fair
statement of the Court's waiver jurisprudence. 172 A more forthright review
of the Supreme Court's attorney waiver cases contextualizing the strength
of Faretta'slanguage was provided by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.
Bailey:
[T]he Court's stance on effective waiver of counsel has
been longstanding .... In [its] earl[y] pronouncements the
Court went beyond the mere assertion that the defendant
must "intelligently" waive his right, to discuss the Government' s burden of proof in showing an intelligent waiver
. . (Here
[
the Court quoted language from Johnson v.
Zerbst and Von Moltke v. Gillies reviewed earlier in this
Comment]. From these cases a general principle emerged.
No court has ever apparently gone so far as to require that
Justice Black's lengthy litany of questions [recited in Von
Moltke] be followed to the letter, in a fashion similar to the
"Miranda" warning, but pre-Farettacourts have uniformly
required that the record, by reason of judicial inquiry or
otherwise, contain173evidence of a defendant's knowing and
informed waiver.
Besides providing an incomplete and biased review of the Supreme
Court's cases, the Dallio majority contextualized federal circuit court
authority in a misleading fashion. A closer examination of the cases,
undertaken below, suggests that, while it is true that the majority of circuit
courts have held that a trial judge need not issue scripted or formulaic

172.
Dalio, 343 F.3d at 561. As discussed supra note 127, although Justice Black's
language in Von Moltke was uttered in the context of the plurality portion of his opinion, it
was echoed in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, and referred to by the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth as if it were the opinion of the Court. While the Dallio court ignored Von
Moltke completely, the court cited Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), both police interrogation-attorney waiver cases
which did not bear on waiver of counsel during court proceedings. See Dallio, 343 F.3d at
563. One has to question why the Second Circuit discounted the Supreme Court's language
in Faretta,ignored Justice Black's plurality language in Von Moltke, but nonetheless cited
Supreme Court cases outside the proceedings context in support of its totality of the
circumstances approach.
173.
United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citation
omitted).
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warnings and that courts should consider a range of circumstances in
determining the propriety of a particular waiver, the cases do not support
the general proposition that a judge is not required to provide some type of
meaningful warning to a criminal defendant who wishes to proceed pro se.
It would prove too lengthy a critique to expose in detail how the
court's grouping of the citations without individual contextualization was
misleading and shifted the weight of the cited authority. Instead, a general
overview of the cases cited by the court, as well as a few pertinent
examples of distortions may suffice.
The court cited eight waiver cases in support of its approach, one each
from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. 174 The court also cited contrary Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuit
decisions in which those courts held that trial judges must provide explicit
and fully detailed waiver warnings in order to insure the constitutionality of
a defendant's waiver. 75 The following discussion examines the eight
ostensibly compatible circuit cases cited by the Dallio court.
As a preliminary observation, in five of the eight cases the Second
Circuit claimed were reviewed by its "sister circuits" under a "similar
approach," 76 the record indicated that the trial judge did provide some
kind of warning to the defendant, including one case in which the record
was "replete with admonitions."' 177 In all of these cases, the warnings went

174.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 n.4. The presumably compatible cases the court cited
were: Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291 (11 th Cir. 2002); United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d
514 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Kind, 194 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317 (10th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bell,
901 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1990); and United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1984).
Dallio,343 F.3d at 563 n.4.
175.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 n.4. The court noted that the Third Circuit required
"specific forewarning of the risks that foregoing counsel's trained representation entails,"
and that the D.C. and Sixth circuits had actually invoked their supervisory powers to require
judges to provide Farettawarnings in the future. See id. In the case of the Sixth Circuit, the
court directed judges to henceforth strictly adhere to model federal bench book inquiries.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Lopez-Ozuna, 242 F.3d at 1199. In United States v. Lopez-Osuna, the Ninth
Circuit noted, "[the defendant] does not dispute that he was made aware of the dangers of
self-representation or the possible penalties he could face if convicted, and the record is
replete with admonitions by the district court on both issues." Id. In United States v. Kind,
the Eighth Circuit quoted the trial record as follows:
THE COURT: ... I will also tell you, though that there is an old adage
around here that a person that represents [himself] has a fool for a client.
And you have got to be pretty careful about this. Remember, this legal
business is very complex and there are a lot of procedures and there are
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beyond the colloquy recorded in Dallio, in which the court provided no
explicit warnings whatsoever. Thus, when those five circuit courts
reviewed the totality of circumstances surrounding the waivers in those
cases, they did not review the surrounding factors in isolation, but in the
context of explicit warnings.18
Moreover, in the three supporting cases cited by the Second Circuit
where the trial court, as in Dallio, did not warn the defendant at trial, the
relevant facts differed significantly from those in Dallio. Although it is

a lot of rules that need to be followed in the process. ... [The prosecutor's] role is to represent the government. His job is to prosecute. My
job is to be a judge. That means that my job is to be an impartial arbitrator. So, when you are asking for this, I'm warning you today, don't
expect very much help from either of us ....
194 F.3d at 904 (quoting the Trial Record without citation) (ellipses and second alteration
added). The Eighth Circuit noted in Kind that the district court conducted a Faretta hearing
and that at that hearing, the judge, "[i]n granting the motion ....
specifically warned [the
defendant] that self-representation was ill-advised and hazardous ... "Id. at 904.
In United States v. Singleton, the Fourth Circuit stated that although the trial
court "did not conduct a formal inquiry, it did advise [the defendant] that he should think
'long and hard' before firing counsel, noting that counsel would be of assistance to him."
107 F.3d at 1098. The court also quoted the trial transcript for the highly probing and
knowledgeable questions posed by the defendant concerning how he could still be assisted
by his counsel in an advisory role were he to proceed pro se. Id. at 1098 n.5. The Fourth
Circuit indicated that the judge's responses to these questions were admonitory. Id. at 1098.
In United States v. Davis, a defendant was permitted by the trial court to follow
his attorney's questioning of witnesses by posing his own questions. 269 F.3d at 517. The
Fifth Circuit quoted the trial record for several oblique warnings given by the trial judge in
this context including: "If you choose to disregard your counsel's advise [sic], I will permit
you to ask the very questions that ... your lawyer chooses not to ask." Id. (quoting Trial
Record without citation); "You have been advised by your counsel that he does not believe
that it's in your best interest not only to ask those questions but to participate in the trial.
Hasn't he told you that?" Id. at 517 n.l; "You believe, I gather, that you are capable of
asking these questions without implicating yourself? . . . And if the answers implicate you,
do you understand ... that that puts you in an awkward position ... with the jury?" Id.
(first and third ellipses added).
In United States v. Hafen, the First Circuit noted, "[i]n the case before us, the
district court warned appellant that he was 'foolish' to proceed without counsel, and he
replied that he understood fully the court's admonition." 726 F.2d at 26. Though this was
in no way a comprehensive warning, it bears consideration that the defendant in Hafen was
"a college graduate with two years of law school." Id. at 25. The court cited the trial
judge's colloquy with the defendant as follows: "'You have the Federal Defender made
available to you. If you are foolish enough to want to go ahead on your own, that is your
business . . . . [The public defender] will be here and available, if you need him.' The
appellant responded: 'I understand fully what you are saying. I know the old adage that,
'He who represents himself', you know .....
Id. at 26 (quoting Trial Record without
citation) (alteration added).
178.
See supra note 178.
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true that the circuit courts in those cases upheld the waivers of counsel
based solely upon the totality of circumstances surrounding the waivers, the
records of those trials clearly indicated both exceptional circumstances
surrounding the waivers, as well as a wealth of legal experience possessed
by the defendants far in excess of the defendant's in Dallio.
First, in Nelson v. Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the trial
judge had already provided the defendant with a full Faretta hearing in a
previous case and had made repeated references to this prior Faretta
hearing on the record. 179 In addition, the trial judge apparently relied on the
fact that the defendant had made "oral and written presentations to the
court contemporaneously and for the last ten years."1 80 By contrast, in
Dallio the Second Circuit could only point to the defendant Dallio's
"considerable criminal history ... which presumably gave him an aboveaverage knowledge of his right to counsel,' ' 181 a couple of written pro se
motions the defendant submitted concerning his current83trial,1 82 and the fact
that he was pursuing a college degree while in prison.
Second, though not mentioned by the Second Circuit in its citation to
United States v. Hughes, the defendant in that case was himself a practicing attorney. 84 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit in Hughes noted that the
"conduct consist[ed] of tactics designed to delay the
attomey/defendant's
1 85
proceedings."
Third, in the Seventh Circuit's United States v. Bell decision, it was
noted by the court that the defendant in that case had earlier represented86
himself at several proceedings resulting from a bank robbery charge.
had acquitted
The Seventh Circuit deemed it significant that the defendant
' 87
himself passably, in fact, "better than a lot of lawyers."'
Thus, it is apparent that in none of the eight decisions the Second Circuit claimed took "a similar approach," did a circuit court uphold a counsel
waiver made by a defendant who received no waiver warnings from the
judge and had no significant legal experience in the courtroom. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the Second Circuit, in reviewing the factors to be

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
1978)).
187.

292 F.3d at 1295-96.
Id. at 1296.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 564 n.5.
Id. See infra note 190 (explaining these motions).
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 564 n.5.
191 F.3d at 1324.
Id. at 1323-24.
901 F.2d at 578 (citing United States v. Bell, 572 F.2d 579, 580 (7th Cir.

Id. at n.4 (quoting Trial Record at 335-36).
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considered in a totality of the circumstances
approach, did not reference a
88
defendant's legal experience as a factor.'
In addition to providing no factual context for the statements of law it
culled from the circuits, the court's presentation of these statements was, in
a number of instances, extremely misleading. For example, the Second
Circuit's parenthetical in citation to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hughes,
in its entirety, was as follows:
United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that waiver of counsel "may be valid
absent an inquiry by the court where the surrounding facts
and circumstances, including the defendant's background
and conduct demonstrate that [he] actually understood his
right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation
and knowingly and intelligently
waived his right" (internal
189
quotation marks omitted)).
This truncated quote was not a fair representation of what the Tenth
Circuit held in Hughes because it omitted the Tenth Circuit's key limiting
language preceding this quote, namely that, "In such a situation, a waiver
may be valid absent an inquiry by the court ....,,190 The "situation"
referred to by the Hughes court was one in which a defendant engaged in
improper conduct "designed to delay the proceedings,"' 91 "play[ed] a cat
and mouse game with the court,' ' 19 2 or "trifl[ed] with the court,"' 19 3 as the
defendant in that case, a practicingattorney, had allegedly done. 194

188. The court quoted its earlier Fore decision for the factors to be considered,
namely, "'defendant's education, family, employment history, general conduct, and any
other relevant circumstances."' Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 (quoting Fore, 169 F.3d at 108).
The only reference made to the defendant's legal experience was provided by the court in a
footnote in rebuttal to the concurrence's charge that there was not "even a glimmer" of
evidence in the record demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver. Id. at 564 n.5. The
court cited two motions apparently filed pro se by the defendant, one for reassignment of
counsel and another "seeking dismissal of his indictment on speedy trial grounds." Id.
189. Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 n.4 (quoting Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323-24).
190. Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323-24 (emphasis added).
191.
Id. at 1323.
192. Id. at 1323 (quoting United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1578 (10th Cir.
1990)).
193. Id. at 1324 (quoting Unites States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir.
1985)).
194. Id. at 1324.
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What the Tenth Circuit clearly articulated in Hughes was that "a thor95
ough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the defendant on the record"',
was required by that circuit except in "certain limited situations," where the
defendant's improper conduct precluded the necessity for such an
inquiry. 196 This is a far cry from what the Second Circuit's uncontextualized parenthetical suggests.
Similarly, the court's citation to the Ninth Circuit's Lopez-Osuna decision was misleading, quoting out of context that court's language
"rejecting [the] 'use [of] a particular script' to assess knowing and
intelligent waiver of counsel," and its statement that "'the focus should be
19 7
on what the defendant understood, rather than on what the court said.'
In point of fact, the Ninth Circuit in Lopez-Osuna reaffirmed that "[i]n
order for a waiver of the right to counsel to be knowing and intelligent, the
defendant must be made aware of the 'three elements' of selfrepresentation: '(1) the nature of the charges against him; (2) the possible
1 98
penalties; and (3) the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation."'
Indeed, the defendant in Lopez-Osuna did not deny that he had been
repeatedly warned by the court concerning the latter two elements,
claiming only, against the procedural evidence, "that he did not understand
the charges he was facing at trial."' 199

Finally, the court's citation to the Fifth Circuit's language in United
States v. Davis was perhaps the most disingenuous of the court's parentheticals. The court's citation to that case, in its entirety, was as follows:
United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 518-19 (5th Cir.
2001) (noting that although court "has consistently required... Farettawarnings," there is "no sacrosanct litany
for warning defendants against waiving the right to counsel," and district courts must exercise discretion

195.
Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323 (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384,
1388 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835(1975))).
196.
Id.
197.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 (quoting Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d at 1199).
198.
Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d at 1199 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d
614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added).
199.
Id. Though the Ninth Circuit in rejecting the petitioner's claim conceded that
the defendant told the trial court "that he did not know what charges were pending against
him," it cited to the records of earlier hearings where the charges and the elements of proof
for those charges were fully explained to the defendant. Id.

20051

EDIcT V.DICTA

"[d]epending
on the circumstances of the individual
2
case"). 00

The court framed the last of the quotes in the parenthetical such that it
excised what the Fifth Circuit was actually referring to that was subject to
an "exercise of discretion." What the Fifth Circuit actually stated was,
"Depending on the circumstances of the individual case, the district court
must exercise its discretion in determining the precise nature of the
warning. 2'0 In a lengthy footnote immediately following this statement,
the court noted, "The Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges . . .
provides a guide for questions the judge can ask to convey the disadvantages the defendant will likely suffer if he proceeds per se [sic]., 20 2 The
court then proceeded to quote the Benchbook's numerous and comprehensive warnings in their entirety20 3 a clear indication that the court, while not

200.
201.
202.
203.

Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 n.4 (quoting Davis, 269 F.3d at 518-19).
Davis, 269 F.3d at 519 (emphasis added).
Id. at 519 n.11.
The Benchbook's questions, quoted by the court, are as follows:
(1) Have you ever studied law? (2) Have you ever represented yourself
in a criminal action? (3) Do you understand that you are charged with
these crimes: [state the crimes with which the defendant is charged]?
(4) Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged
in Count I the court must impose an assessment of $50 and could sentence you to as many as years in prison and fine you as much as
$_ ? [Ask defendant a similar question for each crime with which he
or she may be charged in the indictment or information.] (5) Do you
understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of those crimes
this court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is,
one after another? (6) Do you understand that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission has issued sentencing guidelines that will affect your sentence if you are found guilty? (7) Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you or even advise
you how you should try your case. (8) Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence? (9) Do you understand that the Federal Rules
of Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial
and that, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules? (10)
Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? (11)
Do you understand that those rules govern the way a criminal action is
tried in federal court? [Then say to defendant something to this effect:]
(12) I must advise you that in my opinion a trained lawyer would defend
you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you
to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are
not familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with the rules of
evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. (13)
Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REViEW

[Vol. 26

requiring a judge to follow the "sacrosanct litany" of the benchbook, at
least required the judge to provide something approaching it in function.
As an overall opinion, the Davis decision was in no way ambiguous.
The issue was clearly presented as follows: "The question here is whether
[the defendant] made a sufficiently knowing and intelligent choice to
represent himself, and this turns on whether the judge sufficiently warned
[the defendant] of the dangers of waiving his right to counsel.,, 20 4 The Fifth
Circuit held that the district court "was required to warn [the defendant] of
the perils and disadvantages of representation," and that the judge had
failed to adequately do so, 20 5 in spite of the fact that the defendant's
counsel had explicitly warned the defendant, and the judge had permitted
"hybrid" representation where the defendant and his attorney alternately
questioned witnesses.2 °6
Despite the Second Circuit's claim that Davis, like the other cases the
court cited, took a similar "totality of the circumstances" approach to its
own, the Fifth Circuit's analysis for its holding provided not a single
factual reference to the defendant's background, age, or experience.20 7 The
Fifth Circuit's opinion made reference only to the facts surrounding how
the self-representation unfolded at trial.20 8
Clearly then, the thrust of the Davis court's opinion was not that a
"sacrosanct litany" of warnings could give way to a discretionary totality of
the circumstances test, but that explicit Faretta warnings were required,
and that the surrounding circumstances should be considered by the judge
in determining what sort of Farettawarnings were required. 2 9 There was
absolutely no suggestion whatsoever in Davis that a trial judge could
forego explicitly warning a defendant wishing to proceed pro se because
surrounding
circumstances showed his waiver was knowing and intelli210
gent.

guilty, and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do
you still desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? (14) Is your decision entirely voluntary? [If the
answers to the two preceding questions are yes, say something to the
following effect:] (15) I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I therefore permit the defendant to
represent himself [herself].
BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DIST. COURT JUDGES 1.02 (4th ed. 2000).
204.
Davis, 269 F.3d. at 518 (emphasis added).
205.
Id. at 520.
206.
Id. at 517.
207.
Id. at 516-20.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 518-20.
210. Davis, 269 F.3d. at 516-20.
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Fairly cited, Hughes, Lopez-Osuna, and Davis were actually negative
authority for the Dallio opinion, more properly to be grouped with the
Third, Sixth and D.C. Circuit's opinions. Thus, six of the eleven circuit
cases cited by the court quite strongly presented contrary law, while the
remaining five decisions presented starkly different factual contexts in
which compatible law was stated.
Even if the court's review of relevant circuit law was accurate, it
would not change the precedential, destructive nature of the Dallio
decision. Dallio not only stands for the fact that the Supreme Court's
Farettapronouncements on the necessity for waiver warnings were dictum,
but it also substantially diminishes the standard for a valid waiver warning.
After Dallio, it appears that a state trial court within the Second Circuit
need not provide any waiver warnings whatsoever to a criminal defendant
to effect a valid constitutional waiver of counsel as long as there is
evidence in the record that the defendant: has a lengthy criminal record, has
written a couple of pro se motions, possesses intelligence and some
education, and has reached his decision after consulting with the attorney
he wishes to replace.
The Dallio decision is a good example of how a federal court, in making a habeas determination under § 2254(d) of the AEDPA, can significantly erode a constitutional protection, while appearing to merely conform
to the dictates of that statute under a purely formal inquiry. Yet the Second
Circuit's legal interpretationin characterizing Faretta'spronouncements
on warnings as dictum was just that-an interpretation, and a highly
questionable one at that. Therefore, it would be a stretch indeed to say that
the Dallio court was constrained under § 2254(d) to disavow Faretta's
pronouncements in order to resolve its habeas determination.
The Second Circuit could simply have upheld the district court's holding, finding a constitutional violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel yet deeming it harmless error, as the concurrence would
have done. It seems very unlikely that had the Second Circuit found a
constitutional violation, the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari,
much less reversed a determination relying on Faretta'spronouncements as
a holding rather than dictum. As it is, however, the Second Circuit did not
find a constitutional violation, and the Supreme Court has now denied
certiorari, foreclosing any further chance of appeal. 2 '
Consequently, as typically happens when federal circuit courts review
alleged constitutional violations under § 2254(d), the Second Circuit in
Dallio was the final arbiter of Supreme Court law in a discrete area of

211.

Dallio, 343 F.3d 553, cert denied, 541 U.S. 961 (2004).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26

defendants' constitutional rights. The court acted as the ultimate constitutional authority for its own jurisdiction, and no doubt set a persuasive
precedent for other jurisdictions. Yet, because of the highly formalistic
nature of the § 2254(d) inquiry, and the presumed procedural posture that
the federal courts are constrained by what is an exceedingly deferential
standard, circuit courts typically provide no policy or even rationale behind
their interpretation of Supreme Court law. Indeed, the Second Circuit in
Dallio provided not a shred of policy or any discussion on the relative
advantages or disadvantages of validating attorney waivers in the absence
of warnings from the trial judge.
The closest the court got to establishing any rationale for its holding
was by its quoting of the Supreme Court's statement in Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, that "[tihe task of judging the competence of a
particular accused cannot be escaped by announcing delusively simple
212
rules of trial procedure which judges must mechanically follow.
However, a review of the explicit, highly pertinent waiver questions
suggested by The Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges gives the lie to
the notion that a judge who would be conscientious enough to conduct such
an in-depth inquiry would be doing so in order to shirk the task of judging a
defendant's competence. On the contrary, questions from the judge such
as:
(5) Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more
than one of those crimes this court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after another?
(6) Do you understand that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued sentencing guidelines that will affect your
sentence if you are found guilty? (7) Do you understand
that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you or even advise you how you should try your
case. (8) Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence? (9) Do you understand that the Federal Rules of
Evidence govern
what evidence may or may not be intro213
duced at trial?
actually seem likely to stimulate meaningful colloquy with the defendant.
In addition, warnings such as:

212.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 269, 277 (1942)).
213.
BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DIST. COURT JUDGES 1.02 (4th ed. 2000).
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(12) I must advise you that in my opinion a trained lawyer
would defend you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself.
You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar
with court procedure. You are not familiar with the rules
of evidence.
I strongly urge you not to try to represent
2 14
yourself.
seem likely to make all but the most assured defendants think twice before
proceeding on their own. Indeed, field studies have indicated that "where
trial judges were painstakingly careful in providing counsel and explaining
the important role that a defense lawyer may play, only one or two percent
[of defendants] waived counsel. 2 15
Such statistics are not surprising. After all, common sense suggests
that warnings from a judge are of an altogether different character from
those from an attorney who may "no longer [be] trusted. 216 Even the most
stubborn of defendants understands that although defense counsel may
have a vested interest in continuing representation, a judge's advice is
delivered with greater impartiality on the issue. Additionally, the defendant likely recognizes the judge as a figure of authority whose grave advice
against self-representation signals the likelihood of an unfavorable result.
Thus the advice of an attorney cannot adequately substitute for the gravity
of warnings from a presiding judge.217
Similarly, the Dallio court's assertion that the defendant's "considerable criminal history" gave him "an above-average knowledge of his right
to counsel" 218 is a doubtful substitute for explicit warnings from a judge.
Particularly if the defendant has been consistently convicted during his
lengthy criminal history, his experience with the criminal justice system
may not have imbued him with a full appreciation for the importance of
counsel. 21 9 Furthermore, those who watch any skilled activity long enough

214.

Id.

YALE KAMISAR ET. AL, CRIM. PROC. 1092 (10th ed. 2002).
216.
Davis, 269 F.3d at 520.
217.
See id. at 517 n. 1 (quoting from a trial record showing that the judge confirmed
that the defendant was disregarding the advice of his attorney in proceeding pro se, and
holding that "[tihe court's reliance on the warnings against self-representation given by [the

215.

defendant's] counsel ...

was not sufficient").

218.
Dallio, 343 F.3d at 564 n.5.
219.
One commentator has offered numerous reasons that explain why an
experienced defendant might embark on self-representation, many of which, it would seem,
might be dispelled by proper warnings:
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may begin to think that they themselves could do better at it, even if such
thoughts are delusive. 220 Therefore, it is possible that some defendants with
longer criminal records are actually in need of an even more grave and
comprehensive warning.2 2'

Concern about the public defender's heavy caseload ....
a perception
that the public defender lacks independence from the prosecutor .... a
judgment that the defendant himself has greater experience than appointed counsel .... an expectation that the court will provide aid ....
a suspicion that the prosecutor will be less than zealous in dealing with a
pro se defendant ....
the recognition that a pro se defendant may, by
calculated lapses from the role of attorney into that of witness, testify
without fear of cross-examination .... a hope that his performance will
elicit the sympathy of the jury ....
a fear that acceptance of counsel
will force a loss of control over presentation of the case .... an unwillingness to be represented by an attorney of a different color or political
philosophy .... a belief that the facts of the case are too complex to be
mastered by an attorney .... or simply a desire to save legal fees.
CONST. RTs. OF THE ACCUSED § 8:1 (June 2003) (quoting Comment 86 YALE L.J. 292, 29394 n.7 (1976)).
220.
One legal scholar has probed the mindset of a pro se defendant as follows:
The question of why people wish to represent themselves is not easily
resolved. Some have suggested that innocent individuals accused of a
crime have such blind faith in their own innocence and the infallibility
of justice that they entertain the beliefs that they will be acquitted no
matter what. Many individuals, in addition, apparently feel that a selfinflicted burden of defending themselves will evoke the sympathy of the
court or jury. Moreover, there are those who have become so involved
with television's criminal defense series syndrome that they in fact feel
capable of handling their own defense.
CONST. RTs OF THE ACCUSED § 9:1 (June 2003) (quoting Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U.
MtMI L. REv. 551, 552 (1969)).
Another commentator has suggested that those who often watch litigation on
television may be more inclined to choose self-representation in a civil case.
Frequent viewers may also be inclined to represent themselves pro se.
After all, though they may not be lawyers, they've seen it all on TV.
Syndi-court presents average people litigating their own disputes without the aid of a lawyer, almost half of whom win. Thus, viewers may
come to believe that either pro se representation is not very difficult or
that pro se representation still ensures a 50 percent likelihood of success.
It may also cause viewers to believe that judges will assist them, as this
is what occurs on television.
Kimberlianne Podlas, Should We Blame Judge Judy? The Messages TV Courtrooms Send
Viewers, 86 JUDICATURE 38, 42 (July-August 2002).
221.
Even experienced attorneys in civil cases, if allowed the economic incentive to
do so, may make the questionable choice to represent themselves. The Supreme Court, in
affirming a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that an attorney representing himself
was not entitled to fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1988, strongly outlined the policy behind discouraging self-representation by an attorney in
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Although Faretta established that a defendant has a constitutional
right to self-representation, in practice it is exceedingly rare that a
defendant can obtain a better result by representing himself. 222 Moreover,
outside of protecting against encroachment on this limited individual right,
there do not appear to be any counterbalancing societal policy interests in
favor of allowing defendants to proceed pro se without benefit of warnings
or discouragement.223
Though a comprehensive discussion on the policy interests supporting
discouragement of self-representation goes beyond the scope of this
Article, it may do to note that in addition to strong equitable interests in
assuring fair trials for criminal defendants, at least two "pragmatic"
concerns are weighty. First, trials at which defendants represent them-

a civil trial, listing the factors that made such representation potentially less effective:
Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in
contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate
for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason,
rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen
developments in the courtroom. The adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators.
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1991).
222.
One survey of defendant self-representation in the Chicago Criminal Courts
made the following finding: "'[Tihe figures for self-represented defendants are sobering.
Many judges remarked that they could not remember a victorious pro se defendant in a
felony case and virtually all of the rest put the success rate at less than five percent."'
CONST. RTS OF THE AccusED § 8:1 (June 2003) (quoting Comment, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 240, 249 (1972)).
The Second Circuit itself has remarked: "It seems to us that no matter how
intelligent or educated a layman might be, he lacks the skill and knowledge to defend
himself adequately." Id. quoting United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1971).
The District Court for the Northern District Court of New York has remarked: "I am
familiar with the right to defend pro se, but wonder whether it is not akin to allowing a
layman to perform his own surgery." Id. quoting United States ex rel. DiBlasi v. McMann,
236 F.Supp. 592, 593 (N.D.N.Y. 1964), affd 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965).
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has opined that the Faretta court itself
recognized that pro se representation was rarely a successful strategy on the part of a
defendant: "The Faretta Court assumed that the overwhelming majority of laymen who
defend themselves in a criminal action will fair worse than those represented by skilled
counsel." Id. (quoting United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 350 (6th Cir. 1987)).
223.
Unless perhaps one promotes the morally indefensible and cynical interest in
seeing more overall convictions of "wily" defendants despite the heightened possibility for
false convictions of the innocent.
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selves are far more difficult to conduct, both for judges and prosecutors. 224
Second, the
conviction may be suspect and create more litigation and
225
appeals.
A reasoned consideration of policy interests suggests that selfrepresentation is to be discouraged. Yet, reasoned policy interests do not
come into play when federal courts conduct habeas inquiries under §
2254(d). Under the dictates of that law, convictions of criminals are to be
reviewed with dispatch and consideration of broader implications to be
discouraged, regardless of the costs in diminished standards for the conduct
of future criminal trials.
V.

WRONGFUL CONVICTION THROUGH STATE-INTRODUCED PERJURY:

DRAKE V. PORTUONDO

The following section summarizes Supreme Court and Second Circuit
jurisprudence on violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process through
state-introduced witness perjury. A critical analysis follows on the Second
Circuit's recent habeas decision, Drake v. Portuondo,226 which, while
shedding light on the inequities that occurred at the petitioner's trial, as a
mechanistic AEDPA precedent, worked to remove federal constitutional
restraints on state prosecutorial misconduct. The section concludes with a
brief review of Grant v. Ricks,227 a district court decision that relied on
Drake in addressing a claim of state-introduced perjury. Grant provides a
good example of how precedents established under the AEDPA in cases
like Drake will help to produce formalistic and inequitable habeas reviews
well into the future.

224.
See Bailey, 675 F.2d at 1300 (stating, "It is obviously in the interest of all
participants in a criminal proceeding, including the prosecutor, to be familiar with [the]
requirement [that the court make clear on the record the awareness by defendants of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation] ....); See also Dallio, 343 F.3d at 557
(mentioning the prosecutor's "exasperation" with the defendant and quoting the prosecutor's
statement that: "I think the questions that the defendant is asking illustrates his inability to
go pro se in this matter." Id. (quoting Trial Record at 76-77)).
225.
See Bailey, 675 F.2d at 1300 (stating, "The most efficient dispatch of judicial
business occurs when a short discussion [on the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation] on the record in the trial court can effectively limit both the number of
appeals and the problems presented by those that are nevertheless filed.").
226.
321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2003).
227.
Nos. 00-CV-6861 JBW, 03-MISC-0066 JBW, 2003 WL 21847238 (E.D.N.Y.
July 29, 2003) (unpublished decision).
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A. STATE-INTRODUCED PERJURY

As long ago as 1935, the Supreme Court in Mooney v. Holohan228 held
that a state's "contrivance" to obtain a conviction through the use of
perjured testimony was a violation of a criminal defendant's right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.22 9 The Court declared that "deliberate deception of court and jury by
the presentation of testimony known to be perjured" was
230 unquestionably
"inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice.,
Roughly twenty years later, in Napue v. Illinois,2 3 1 the Court enlarged
upon Mooney in holding that when the state allowed testimony that it knew
to be false to go uncorrected, the same result was mandated as when the
state knowingly intended to introduce perjury. 32 The Court further held
that false testimony was no less tainted simply because it impacted only on
the credibility of the witness.233 The Court explained that when an
individual's "life or liberty" hung in the balance, "subtle factors" such as an
accusing witness's self-interest in testifying against the defendant could be
of the utmost importance to the jury in weighing that witness's testimony. 234
Though these earlier decisions stressed the degree of prosecutorial
knowledge in the presentation of the perjury, the Supreme Court's
landmark decision Brady v. Maryland235 established a different standard. In
Brady, the Supreme Court held that a new trial was required when the
prosecution suppressed evidence requested by the defense that was
"material either44to guilt or to punishment" of the accused. 236 In stirring
language by Justice Douglas, the Court made clear that determining
whether the defendant had received due process and fair treatment at trial
did not hinge on "the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution":
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of
society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the

228.
229.

294 U.S. 103 (1935).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-13.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.

230.

Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.
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guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our
system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of
the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly
for the federal domain: "The United States wins its point
whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts." A
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate
him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the
role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport
with standards of justice, even though, as in the present
case, his action is not "the result of guile,"
to use the words
237
of the [Maryland] Court of Appeals.

The effect of Brady, then, was to shift the focus from the conduct of the
prosecutor to the materiality of the exculpatory evidence suppressed.
In United States v. Agurs,238 the Supreme Court enlarged upon the
materiality principle established in Brady, conceiving of it as an umbrella
rule for several situations "involv[ing] the discovery, after trial of
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the
defense.,239 The Court suggested that there were three types of cases where
the Brady rule "arguably applie[d]": (1) where "the undisclosed evidence
demonstrate[d] that the prosecution's case include[d] perjured testimony
24
and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury,; 0
(2) where the defense made a specific request for evidence which was
suppressed by the prosecution; 241 or (3) where the defense made a general
request for information that might exculpate the defendant, that is, any socalled "Brady material. 24 2 The court indicated that a due process violation
in each of these categories might require a different standard of material43
ity.

2

The Court noted that in a series of previous rulings it had "consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured
testimony [was] fundamentally unfair, and [had to] be set aside if there

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 87-88 (quoting Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1961)).
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 104, 107.
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[were] any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury." 244 The Court concluded that this "strict
standard of materiality" did not necessarily apply to the other two
categories discussed in Agurs-the suppression of exculpatory evidence
specifically or generally requested-since in those cases prosecutorial
misfeasance was not necessarily implicated.245
It was in regard to the suppression of generally requested exculpatory
information that the Agurs Court actually ruled. 246 However, the Court's
"known or should have known" language in regard to the first category,
state-introduced perjury, broadened the definition of prosecutorial
"knowledge" and precipitated a split among the circuits. 247 While the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adopted the "should have
known" language of Agurs,248 the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits generally applied standards requiring actual knowledge of perjury
by the prosecution. 249
In 1988, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals actually went beyond
Agurs, holding in Sanders v. Sullivan250 that a habeas petitioner's conviction could not stand "when a credible recantation of [perjurious] testimony
... would most likely change the outcome of the trial.",25' Based upon its
weighing of equitable principles, the court stated, "[i]t is simply intolerable
in our view that under no circumstance will due process be violated if a

244.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court cited
inter alia Napue, 360 U.S. 264; Giglio, 405 U.S. 150.
245.
Id. at 104, 107.
246.
The Court held that the prosecution had a duty to disclose exculpatory Brady
evidence even if not requested with specificity, but only "if the omitted evidence create[d] a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Id. at 111-12.
247.
See In re Benn, 952 P.2d 116, 151 (Wash. 1998) (discussing this split).
248.
U.S. v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 587 (1st Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Wallach, 979 F.2d
912, 914 (2d Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Biberfeld, 957 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 933 (4th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Runge, 593 F.2d 66, 73 (8th Cir. 1979);
Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002).
249.
United States v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 530
U.S. 830 (1994) (citing United States v. Chagra, 735 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1984))
(reversal only justified where "contested statements were actually false .... material, and..
. the prosecution knew that they were false"); United States v. O'Dell, 805 F.2d 637, 641
(6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 859 (1987) (also citing Chagra,735 F.2d 870) (same);
Shore v. Warden, Stateville Prison, 942 F.2d 1117, 1122 (7th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 504
U.S. 922 (1992) (due process violated only where prosecution "knowingly or intentionally"
introduced perjured testimony); U.S. v. Michael, 17 F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1994) ("It is
axiomatic that only the knowing use of false testimony constitutes a due process
violation.").
250.
863 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1988).
251.
Id. at 222.
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state allows an innocent person to remain incarcerated on the basis of
lies. 252
Recognizing that a due process violation had to "have a state action
component, ' 253 and could not solely result from a wrong committed by a
witness, the Second Circuit looked to Justice Douglas's 1956 dissent in
Durley v. Mayo.254 In that case, the majority ruled 5-4 that a habeas
petitioner's appeal on a cattle rustling conviction was barred by res
judicata. However, Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Clark, contended that the court should have ruled on the
merits of the case. 5 Justice Douglas, expressing the view of the dissent,
stated:
It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of
testimony known to the prosecution to be perjured offends
due process. While the petition did not allege that the
prosecution knew that the petitioner's codefendants were
lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now knows
that the testimony of the only witness against petitioner
was false. No competent evidence remains to support the
conviction. Deprivation of a hearing under these circumstances amounts in my opinion to a denial of due process
of law.256
Adopting the view expressed by the dissent in Durley, the Second
Circuit established precedent in Sanders that state action could be found in
state knowledge of a credible recantation even after trial.257
The Second Circuit in Sanders emphasized that the court was not
opening the door wide to retrials since it was maintaining a high materiality
standard.258 The court declared that perjured testimony constituting a
denial of due process had to "be of an extraordinary nature," engendering
"a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most
likely not have been convicted. 259 On the one hand, Sanders broadened
the range of prosecutorial-introduced perjury that could potentially

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 224.
Id.
351 U.S. 277 (1956).
Sanders, 863 F.2d at 223.
Durley, 351 U.S. at 290-91 (citations omitted).
Sanders, 863 F.2d at 223.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
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implicate a due process violation to include perjury of which the prosecution was neither aware nor should have been aware. On the other hand,
Sanders maintained a high standard of materiality for perjury not implicating prosecutorial knowledge. 260 The Second Circuit thus attempted to
strike a balance between protecting the basic due process rights of
convicted defendants, and maintaining finality and stability in the system.
The principles announced in Sanders remained established federal
habeas law in the Second Circuit for close to fifteen years. At the time that
Sanders was decided, more than seven years before the advent of the
AEDPA, probably no judge could have imagined that such a weighty
decision, affecting the most fundamental aspects of due process at trial,
would one day be overturned without a word of discussion regarding
fairness, constitutional rights, or policy. Yet, as the following review of the
Second Circuit's recent decision in Drake v. Portuondo26 1 demonstrates,
courts conducting a § 2254 inquiry are not compelled to provide discussion
on fundamental principles of justice. Under § 2254's dictates, cases at
hand are adjudicated and well-established precedents erased with equal
formal dispatch.
B.

DRAKE V. PORTUONDO

In Drake, a convicted murderer, Robie Drake, more than a dozen
years after his conviction, 262 and "years after exhausting his direct
appeals, '263 discovered through his own in-prison research that an "expert"
prosecution witness who testified against him at trial was a fraud who lied
about his credentials. 264 Because the only issue at Drake's trial was
whether he manifested the requisite intent to sustain a charge of second
degree murder, the expert's testimony was crucial, because it provided a
psychological motive tying together various pieces of the prosecution's
evidence.265

260.
Id. at 225. The court noted that prior to 1975 it had applied "the less stringent
test of Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), which ... grant[ed] a new trial
if the court determine[d] that the new evidence [of perjury] 'might' alter the verdict of the
jury." Id. After 1975, however, the court noted that it had "limited the application of
Larrison to cases alleging the prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony." Id.
261.
321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2003).
262.
Drake was convicted in 1982. He first moved to vacate his conviction based on
newly-discovered evidence of perjury in 1995. Id. at 340, 343.
263.
Id. at 342.
264.
Id.
265.
Id. at 341-42.
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The facts of Drake's crime are not the type that engender sympathy
for the defendant. Shortly after midnight on a December night in 1981,
Robie Drake, a high school student dressed in battle fatigues and carrying
two loaded rifles, extra ammunition, and two hunting knives, went to a
junkyard nearby a factory parking lot in North Townawanda, New York,
where he claimed he liked to practice shooting at abandoned cars. 2 66 Drake
came across a rusted Chevy Nova in the factory parking lot with its
windows steamed up. 267 He claimed that he believed that the car was
uninhabited because the engine was off and no sound came from within. 68
Drake fired into the passenger's side2 69
window, unloading all nineteen
rounds of his semi-automatic rifle's clip.
Inside the car were two high school teenagers who were using the
secluded spot as a lovers' lane.2 70 Drake claimed that when he inspected
the car after firing into it, he discovered that he had shot a young man and
woman multiple times and that the man was fully clothed and the woman in
a state of undress. 27 1 He claimed that he then stabbed the male victim to
stop him from groaning, but that he "'didn't mean to kill him or anything.' 2 72 Drake then drove the Nova to two secluded locations. 7 3 At the
first, he put the male victim's body in the car's trunk. 74 At the second
location, he was in the process of putting the female victim's body in the
trunk when he was apprehended by police.27 5
At Drake's trial, the prosecution presented its theory that the murder
was an intentional sex crime. 276 The prosecution argued that because the
windows of the car were steamed up, Drake must have known there were
people in the car.277 Additionally, Drake and the two victims attended the
same high school, and according to the testimony of one witness, Drake
had had an argument with the male victim in the hallway of the school a
few weeks before the shooting. 278 Moreover, the emergency room doctor
testified that after pronouncing the female victim dead, he discovered

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Drake, 321 F.3d at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 341 (quoting Trial Record at 267).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 341.
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trauma to her rectum and "mud near her private parts., 279 Finally, the
state's forensic experts found 280bite marks on each of the female victim's
breasts, inflicted post-mortem.
Prior to Drake's trial, the judge notified the parties that he had an upcoming "out-of-town judicial commitment" and that the trial had to be
wrapped up by the Tuesday following the week of the trial's commencement, at the latest. 281 On Thursday night of the first week of trial, two

working days before the close of the trial, the prosecution informed the
defense of its intention to call an expert psychological profiler, Richard D.
Walter, to testify.28 2 The next day, Friday, Walter qualified as an expert
based upon his testimony that he had:
extensive experience in the field of psychological profiling,
including: work on 5000 to 7500 cases over several years
in the Los Angeles County Medical Examiner's Office; an
adjunct professorship at Northern Michigan University;
more than four years as a prison psychologist with the
Michigan Department of Corrections; and expert testimony
given at hundreds of criminal trials in Los Angeles and
Michigan.2 83
Walter, without having examined the defendant, and based entirely
"on his review of grand jury testimony, medical evidence and the police
record,,284 testified that the defendant had committed "'lust-murder,"'
' 285
gratifying sexual urges derived from a condition he called "picquerism.
He explained that "picquerism," a term with origins in the French word
"piquer," meaning "to stick or poke" was a condition whereby the
"picquerist" would obtain sexual gratification through "biting, shooting,
stabbing, and [/or] sodomizing [his] victims.

286

The prosecution later admitted it offered Walter's testimony, which
"dovetailed" nicely with the prosecution's physical evidence, "to reinforce

279.
Id. No traces of semen were found anywhere on the victim, only on Drake's
underwear. Id.
280.
Id.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 342.
Id.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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what it perceived as weaknesses in the evidence supporting its theory of
intent. '' 287 Though unaware that Walter was a fraud, the defense argued
that Walter's testimony should be stricken from the record on the grounds
that his statement that, as a fact, the defendant had committed "lustmurder" invaded the province of the jury in deciding the one issue at trialwhether Drake acted with intent.288 Left with only a weekend to find a
witness to rebut Walter's testimony, defense counsel searched in vain for
an expert who had even heard of "picquerism" and on the following
Monday reported as much to the judge. 289 The defense asked the judge for
a two-week continuance in order to have more time to find a psychologist
who could rebut Walter, but after the prosecution argued in opposition to
the motion, the judge denied the request. 29° Consequently, the last
witnesses were called, summations were made, and the trial ended as
scheduled. 291 Drake was thereafter convicted of second-degree murder on
and received two consecutive sentences of twenty years to
both29counts
2
life.
Drake's prison research concerning Walter's credentials yielded some
extraordinary revelations. Walter, contrary to his claims to have profiled
5000 to 7500 cases for the Los Angeles County Medical Examiner's
Office, had never profiled a single case for that employer. 93 Rather, his
294
duties at that office were simply to clean and maintain the forensic lab.
Additionally, Walter apparently was never employed at all by Northern
Michigan University, let alone employed as an adjunct professor. 9 5
Moreover, his assertion that he gave expert testimony at scores of criminal
trials in Los Angeles between October 1975 and May 1978 was equally
bogus-the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office found not a
single record of Walter having testified at any criminal trial during that
period of time. 2" 6 As if these fabrications were not enough, numerous
credentials and forms of experience seemingly tailored to the facts of the
Drake case, assiduously brought out by the prosecution for the jury, were

287.
Id.
Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant at 13, Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338 (2d
288.
Cir. 2003) (No. 01-2217).
Drake, 321 F.3d at 342.
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
291.
Id.
292.
293.
Id.
Id.
294.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 343.
295.
Id.
296.
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lies.297 Worst of all, the "picquerism" syndrome proposed
by Walter was
"referenced nowhere but in a true-crime paperback., 298
In 1995, upon discovering this evidence of Walter's perjury, Drake
moved to vacate his conviction. 99 Without a hearing, the Supreme Court,
Niagara County, New York, denied Drake's motion. 3 00 The Supreme Court
Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order, and the New York
Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.3 °'
Pursuant to § 2254, Drake filed an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York.302 The district court affirmed the Report and Recommendation of a
federal magistrate judge that Drake's petition "be denied in its entirety. 30 3
The court stated, "as found by both [the magistrate judge] and in prior state
court proceedings, there is nothing in the record indicating that the
prosecution knew or should have known, that Walter was, or may
have
'3 4
been, perjuring himself with respect to his credentials as an expert. 9 0
The court further stated, "Even assuming that petitioner is correct in
his assertion that Walter perjured himself in testifying as an expert witness
and that the prosecution acted as a willing participant, habeas relief is still
not warranted. 30 5 Citing the Supreme Court's Agurs standard, the court
reasoned that Drake failed to demonstrate "'any reasonable likelihood"'
Walter's perjury "'affected the judgment of jury"' and therefore the perjury

297.

For example, Walter testified that 5000 of the cases he profiled for the State of

California were homicides in which he fully took part in reviewing everything from "police
reports, crime photo lab results, the deceased's body, the autopsy reports, witness
statements, and evidence collected in the cases." Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 10,
Drake, (No. 01-2217). After this extensive review of the evidence, Walter claimed not only
to have helped the pathologist and investigators figure out how the crimes happened but the
motives behind the crime that would help the authorities catch the killer. Id. He further
testified that he was involved in twenty-five cases, both in Michigan and in California,
involving bite marks left on the victim. Id.
298.
Drake, 321 F.3d. at 340.
299.
Id. at 343.
300.
Id.
301.
Id.
302.
Drake v. Portuondo, No. 99-CV-0681E(SR), 2001 WL 266021, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001).
303.
Id. The district court supplemented its affirmance by approving the magistrate
judge's denial of Drake's request for further discovery in the case. Id. The court reasoned
that since there was no evidence in the record supporting Drake's claim that the prosecution
was aware or should have been aware of the perjury, Drake was "not entitled to pursue a
fishing expedition in hopes of finding some heretofore unknown damaging evidence." Id.
304.
Id.
305.
Id. at *2.
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did not justify a reversal of his conviction. 306 The court concluded by
stating that the evidence without Walter's testimony was still "overwhelming" against the petitioner and that "[n]o rational trier of fact could have
found differently. 3 °7
Drake appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming (a)
that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as well as his right to
compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment were violated through the
prosecution's use of surprise testimony and the judge's refusal to grant a
continuance, which in combination "deprived him of the opportunity to
present a meaningful defense"; and (b) that his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were violated when the prosecution presented testimony it
"knew or should have known" was perjured.3 °8
The Second Circuit began its discussion with a standard recitation of
the applicable standards for a habeas inquiry under § 2254.309 Next, the
court swiftly dismissed Drake's claim that he was denied a meaningful
defense as a result of the judge's refusal to grant him a continuance. 310 The
resolution of Drake's meaningful defense claim, though not the focus of
this Comment and perhaps less important as a legal precedent, was
nonetheless highly representative of the formalistic and inequitable
outcomes produced by AEDPA habeas reviews. 311
After the court

306.
Drake, 2001 WL 266021, at *2 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103).
307.
Id.
308.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 340.
309.
Id. at 343-44.
310.
Id. at 344.
311.
The court's resolution of this claim was not only divorced from fundamental
constitutional notions of fair play and due process at trial, but was also seemingly
undisciplined, even as a formalistic analysis operating within § 2254(d)'s dictates.
The Second Circuit began its discussion of Drake's denial of meaningful
defense claim by noting that "Drake's disadvantage flowed from a refusal to grant a
continuance," and that such refusal was "a matter 'traditionally within the discretion of the
trial judge."' Id. (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). The court seemed
to be providing clearly established Supreme Court law when it quoted the Court for the
proposition that, "[o]nly an unreasoning and arbitrary 'insistence upon expeditiousness in
the face of a justifiable request for delay' violates the [Constitution]." Id. (quoting Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The court then noted that the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division had
affirmed the trial judge's ruling, and stated, "[w]e are constrained under AEDPA to assume
that the Appellate Division's decision was the product of considered judgment." Id. Though
the Appellate Division's memorandum opinion did not reference Drake's meaningful
defense argument whatsoever, nor the trial judge's denial of a continuance, People v. Drake,
684 N.Y.S. 2d 102 (App. Div. 1998), the Second Circuit nonetheless opined, "[t]he
Appellate Division presumably decided that the denial of [Drake's continuance] motion did
not deprive Drake of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Drake, 321

2005]

EDICT V.DICTA

dispatched the denial of meaningful defense claim, it turned to a more
extensive analysis of Drake's state-introduced perjury claim.
The Second Circuit first noted that the Supreme Court analyzed claims
for wrongful conviction resulting from perjured testimony under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 312 The court then asserted
that Agurs' "knew or should have known" standard in regard to stateintroduced perjury was "in the nature of dictum" because the case actually
before the Court in Agurs involved facts indicating actual knowledge by the
prosecution of suppressed evidence.3 13 In the very same paragraph, the

F.3d at 344.

The Second Circuit provided virtually no reasoning for its rejection of Drake's
meaningful defense claim beyond its formalistic adherence to the dictates of the AEDPA.
The court seemed to demand that the petitioner provide tailor-made Supreme Court law
when it asserted, "Drake identifies no Supreme Court authority that would command either
the two-week continuance in a jury trial, or a new trial by reason of its denial." Id. The
court then admitted that the trial judge could have granted something less than a two week
continuance, but nonetheless stated, "[it does not appear to be an unreasonable application
of federal constitutional law to fail to provide a shorter continuance than requested." Id. To
this author, at least, the court seemed to be using the specific fact that the judge denied a
two-week continuance to obscure the fact that the judge denied a continuance request that
under the circumstances was eminently reasonable.
The Second Circuit's analysis was curious. Inexplicably, the Second Circuit
did not explicitly identify the established Supreme Court law that would govern its inquiry.
It assumed that the state courts did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court law
without ever addressing the question of whether the trial judge's denial of the continuance
was "an unreasoning and arbitrary 'insistence upon expeditiousness,"' or whether Drake's
motion represented "a justifiable request for delay." Id. (quoting Morris, 461 U.S. at 12
(quoting Ungar,376 U.S. at 589)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
One has to wonder why the judge's refusal to grant the Drake defense a
continuance was not arbitrary and unreasoning. Drake's trial was to end no later than
Tuesday, solely because the judge had an out-of-town commitment. Id. at 342. The
prosecution introduced its surprise witness, Walter, on Friday, providing the defense notice
on Thursday night. Id. The defense was left with no more than a weekend to search for an
expert to rebut Walter's theory or to prepare a cross-examination. Drake, 321 F.3d at 342.
On the following Monday, the last day of the trial, the defense informed the judge that an
expert could not be found who had even heard of "picquerism." Id. Though defense
counsel's request for a continuance would seem by any standard fully justified under the
circumstances, the judge not only refused to grant a continuance of any length but
apparently offered no good reason for refusing to do so.
What this portion of the Second Circuit's Drake opinion seems to suggest is
that under a § 2254(d) habeas inquiry, it is well nigh impossible for a state judge in the
Second Circuit to offend federal constitutional principles of due process by denying a
continuance at trial. Regardless of whether the denial was unfair or unjustified, the Second
Circuit signaled its refusal to thoroughly apply even a deferential standard of "unreasoning
and arbitrary" to the state court determination.
312.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 344-45 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
313.
Id. at 345.
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Second Circuit provided a footnote which rejected defense reliance on
Sanders for the proposition that habeas relief could be granted "even in the
absence of prosecutorial knowledge of perjury.90 14 The court explained
simply that the Sanders opinion expressly relied upon the dissenting
Justices' opinion in Durley, rather than on clearly established Supreme
Court precedent as mandated by the AEDPA.31 5
Consequently, the Sanders opinion, along with all of its reasoning,
policy, and concern for justice and fair play, was summarily overruled for
the purposes of habeas review, wiped away by a perfunctory footnote
simply noting the legal standard set by the AEDPA. The Second Circuit
was no longer a jurisdiction in which federal courts were charged with
reviewing the constitutionality of state convictions compromised by
perjury, irrespective of prosecutorial knowledge or lack of knowledge. It
was now a circuit in which the federal power to review the constitutionality
of trials marred by testimony the prosecution "should have known" was
perjured was no longer fully assured.
Despite the fact that the Second Circuit characterized Agurs' stateintroduced perjury language as dictum, the court stopped short of abandoning the "should have known" standard, noting only that it had "not yet
considered what it [took] to show that the prosecution 'should have known'
it was sponsoring perjury. 3 16 The court stressed that it had no intention to
"draw the contours of the phrase" including whether or not the phrase
suggested a "standard [that] entail[ed] an exercise of due diligence," until it
was met with a case that necessitated an interpretation. 1 7
The court explained that the case before it did not as yet demand an
interpretation of the standard, since the New York Appellate Division, in
summarily denying the petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction, offered
no findings of fact supporting its conclusion "that the prosecutor neither
knew nor should have known of [the witness's] perjury. 3 18 Therefore, the
circuit court concluded that it had no basis upon which to determine
whether the state courts had "unreasonably applied federal law" under §
constitutional
2254(e)(1), requiring the defendant to demonstrate a 319
violation by "a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence.'
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court for "limited
discovery on the circumstances surrounding Walter's perjured testi-

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 345 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 345.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
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mony, ' 32° noting that although permitting discovery on habeas review was
somewhat unusual, the Supreme Court had held it could "be granted upon a
showing of 'good cause.' ' 321 The court, in deeming it proper to allow the
defendant further exploration, contradicted the district court's assertion that
Drake was "not entitled to pursue a fishing expedition" to uncover
"heretofore unknown damaging evidence." 322 The court stated that after
developing the record, Drake might be able to show "that the prosecution
knew or should have known" of Walter's perjury and "establish a
'reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
323
judgment of the jury.'
While noting that the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
found "'no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different had the evidence [of perjury] been available to defendant and used
by him to impeach the expert,' ' 324 the court nonetheless opined that
Walter's lies concerning his qualifications were significant, gave "force" to
his presentation, and bolstered "his testimony [which] was, medically
speaking, nonsense. ,,325
The Second Circuit also noted that no AEDPA deference would be
required on the issue of harmless error, since the state courts, finding no
constitutional error, had not reached the question. 326 The court, having
already indicated that the perjury was probably material enough to satisfy
Agurs' "reasonable likelihood" standard,327 now strongly signaled that
under the Supreme Court's Brecht v. Abrahamson harmless error standard,
Drake could probably show "that the perjured testimony would have had a
substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. 328
Thus the Second Circuit reduced the habeas question in Drake to a
single determinative issue to be decided after discovery (and if the district
court deemed it necessary, a hearing)-whether Drake could show that the
prosecutor "knew or should have known" of its expert's perjury. No doubt,
to the extent that the petitioner won a chance to develop the record in
regard to the prosecution's awareness of its expert's perjury, and the
opportunity to prove that the prosecution "closed its eyes to that which it

320.
Id. at 346.
321.
Id. (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)).
322.
See Drake, 2001 WL 266021, at *1 (denying the petitioner's request for
discovery on the circumstances surrounding Walter's perjury).
323.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 346 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103)).
324.
Id. (quoting Drake, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 102).
325.
Id. at 346.
326.
Id. at 347.
327.
Id. at 346.
328.
Id. at 347.
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did not want to see,, 329 the Drake decision was a victory for the defense.
By not determining the "contours" of the phrase "knew or should have
known," however, the circuit court left open the possibility that the phrase
might ultimately be defined by the district and circuit court quite narrowly,
placing the burden on the defense to show prosecutorial awareness
approaching actual knowledge rather than requiring the prosecution to
show some minimal exercise of diligence.33 °
Given the Second Circuit's statements suggesting the perjury at
Drake's trial was material, the Drake decision could be seen as a negative
outcome, if not for Drake, then certainly for defendants' constitutional trial
rights. True, the decision finally gave judicial attention to the inequities
arising at the Drake trial, a somewhat reassuring result in itself. Yet the
underlying standard of proof for demonstrating unfairness at trial resulting
from state-introduced perjury was unquestionably raised by the Drake
decision.
First of all, had the Second Circuit not been bound by the dictates of
the AEDPA to abandon its former Sanders standard, which it apparently
was, 331 then according to the court's materiality analysis, the court would
have been compelled to grant a writ of habeas corpus to the defendant
without need for remand. This follows because the only issue remaining
(the extent of the prosecutor's knowledge) would have been irrelevant to
the inquiry.
Moreover, the court's assertion that it was not required by the Drake
case to "draw the contours of the phrase 'should have known"' due to the

329.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 26, Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.
2003) (No. 01-2217).
330.
See Drake, 321 F.3d at 345 (musing on "whatever degree of complicity or
negligence (or worse) [the] phrase [might] entail").
331.
The dissent in Durley has never been explicitly adopted by a majority of the
Supreme Court as a part of a holding. However, two Supreme Court opinions, one of them
dissenting, have positively cited its reasoning.
In Edwards v. People of the State of New York, Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court stated: "I am not unmindful that in the recent case of Durley v. Mayo, four justices of
this court indicated that in some circumstances the innocent use of perjured testimony might
involve a denial of due process. The circumstances in Durley, however, bear no
resemblance to the situation presented here." Edwards v. People of New York, 76 S.Ct.
1058, 1062 n.2 (1956) (citations omitted).
In Jacobs v. Scott, Justice Stevens joined by Justice Ginsburg dissented against
the Court's denial of a writ of certiorari and stay of execution to a defendant slated for
death, citing the Durley dissent's assertion that punishing a defendant when a recantation by
the state's only witness left no credible evidence against the defendant was a denial of due
process. Jacobs v. Scott, 115 S.Ct. 711, 712 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissent also cited Sanders. Id.
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"lack [of] a sufficient factual record,, 332 as well as its decision to remand to
the district court, were not particularly helpful for Drake or future
defendants harmed by egregious state-introduced perjury. The court could
have instead held that while declining to articulate a precise standard for
"should have known," the combined facts of the Drake case already
established in the record indicated prosecutorial malfeasance of a sufficient
degree to warrant issuance of the writ under any reasonable standard.
The court, in making such a ruling, could have pointed to facts such
as: the prosecution's "bringing [Walter] into the jurisdiction on the night
prior to his trial testimony",;3 33 the prosecution's complete failure to
conduct even the most minimal inquiry into Walter's background or his
theories;334 the clear impossibility that Walter could have conducted as
many investigations as he claimed to have done within the claimed period
of time; 335 the way in which "on summation the prosecution capitalized
upon [the defense's inadequate time to refute Walter] and played upon the
image that Walter projected"; 336 as well as the way in which Walter's
theories happened to be tailor-made for the case at hand.337
Alternatively, the court could have looked to other related contexts in
which the Supreme Court has used the language "should have known" and,

332.
Drake, 321 F.3d at 345.
333.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 24, Drake (No. 01-2217).
334.
Id. at 25.
See id. (noting that if the prosecution "had .. . exerted some minimal level of
335.
inquiry it would have realized" Walter's claim to have conducted 5000 to 7500 complete,
in-depth profiling investigations over a period of two and a half years was clearly
impossible since this meant he would have been wrapping up 178 in-depth investigations
per month).
336.
Id. at 23. The prosecution's exact words to the jury regarding Walter were that
he:
was called in here to tell you about a condition, a pathological psychological condition that he's aware of from his experience called picquerism. You didn't hear anybody else come in here and tell you, picquerism
isn't a real thing. It isn't a valid psychological profile. Nobody said
that .... When we can put an expert on the stand that nobody laid a
glove on, in cross examination. That's where you find out if there's
anything wrong with his opinion.
Id. at 23-24 (quoting Trial Record at 1083).
337.
See id. at 12-13. (arguing, "Walter inflicted grave and inestimable damage to
the petitioner's case by tailoring the parameters of his syndrome to the facts of this case,"
and noting that Walter's theory encompassed all circumstances of the crime including the
shooting and stabbing of both victims as well as the bite marks and anal penetration inflicted
post-mortem on the female victim.).
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while not necessarily articulating a permanent standard, drawn sufficient
guidance by analogy to decide the case.338
At the writing of this Article, it remains to be seen how the Drake case
will play out. It is altogether possible that after discovery the district court
will simply find that Drake cannot present sufficient evidence to show that
the prosecutor either had actual knowledge or should have known of
Walter's perjury. In so doing, the district court will likely be forced to
articulate some sort of interpretation of the Agurs standard. The defendant
would then no doubt appeal, and the machinery of justice would most
likely grind to its ultimate conclusion with a final determination at the
circuit court level.
The question of how the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would define the phrase "should have known" or even whether it would choose to
give the standard credence at all, given its statement on dictum, is
intriguing. In the meantime, however, the underlying question, too often
lost in the formalistic preoccupations of the AEDPA habeas inquiry,
remains unanswered-did the defendant receive a fair trial?
The Drake decision, besides having erased Sanders as habeas law, has
cast doubt on Agurs' knew or should have known language, and has
therefore proved to be an influential and much-cited precedent. Labeling
Agurs' language as dictum has already had a significant effect on cases
within the Second Circuit and at least one case within the First Circuit as
well. 339 An examination of a post-Drake Second Circuit case, Grant v.
Ricks,340 provides a pertinent example of how the application of the
AEDPA standard to state-introduced perjury claims, as set forth in Drake,

338.
Examples of the ample cases in which the Court has addressed a "knew or
should have known" standard, most of them qualified immunity cases concerning alleged
misconduct by public officials, include: Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998)
(prison rights context); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (unlawful
military discharge context); Id. at 820-21 (Brennan, J., concurring); Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555, 562-64 (1978) (prison rights context).
In Bader v. Warden, a murder case, petitioner claimed that the prosecution at
339.
his trial "was reckless or closed its eyes" to the falseness of its star witness's testimony, and
then spirited the witness out of the country after he allegedly recanted his testimony. No.
Civ. 02-508-JD, 2003 WL 21228520, at *13 (D.N.H. May 28, 2003). After citing Drake's
holding that the "should have known" language of Agurs was "mere dictum," the court
entertained the "should have known" standard as clearly established Supreme Court law for
the purposes of "analysis only." Id. The court then held that the fact that the prosecution
might have rushed the witness out of the country "[did] not support [the petitioner's]
inference that the prosecution should have known of [the witness's] false testimony at trial.
.Id.
Nos. 00-CV-6861 JBW, 03-MISC-0066 JBW, 2003 WL 21847238 (E.D.N.Y.
340.
July 29, 2003) (unpublished decision).
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may now lead to formalistic, undisciplined analyses of facts and unsettling
determinations on fairness at trial.
C.

GRANT V. RICKS

In Grant v. Ricks, a habeas petitioner convicted of burglary appealed
his conviction based upon interrelated claims of insufficiency of evidence
and lack of a fair trial flowing from perjured testimony introduced against
him at trial.34 ' Specifically, the petitioner asserted that the victim of the
burglary, Bailey, who lost two video cassette recorders and various other
items,342 testified falsely "that he hardly knew"343 the defendant when, in
fact, he and the defendant "were close social acquaintances.
The prosecution's case was based on two primary pieces of evidence.
First, a neighbor of Bailey's testified that he had seen the defendant
knocking on Bailey's door, and later disappearing around the corner of the
house with a red cart, also stolen from Bailey's apartment, stuffed with
items.345 In addition to this eyewitness testimony, the prosecution
presented evidence of a fingerprint, matching the defendant's,
found on the
346
underside of a cable receiver in the victim's apartment.
In response, the defense asserted that although the fingerprint was a
match, it could easily have been left by the defendant on numerous
occasions socializing at Bailey's apartment or at a previous apartment
where Bailey had lived, or when helping Bailey move from one apartment
to the other.347 Additionally, the petitioner pointed to a gaping factual
inconsistency in the prosecution's case concerning Bailey's claim that he
was not on familiar terms with the defendant. Right after the burglary,
Bailey showed the neighbor/eyewitness a photograph of the defendant and
asked him if the person in the photograph was the one he had seen
knocking on the door and hurrying away from the house with the red
cart.348 The neighbor replied that he "thought, but was
not certain, that the
349
earlier.,
seen
had
he
man
the
of
be
might
photograph

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Grant,2003 WL 21847238 at *1, *5.
Id.
Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *1.
Id.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
in rejecting the defendant's legal insufficiency claim, acknowledged that
"[t]he fact that Bailey had a picture of petitioner which he showed to [the
neighbor] would seem to indicate that Bailey and the petitioner knew each
other fairly well. '350 Nonetheless, under the applicable standard,351 the
court concluded that, "[c]onstruing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People, a reasonable juror could have found petitioner
guilty of burglary,"
because "the fingerprint was [not] the sole piece of
352
evidence.,
The court reasoned that the neighbor's testimony that he had seen the
defendant, and that "[a] red cart was stolen from Bailey's house," in
conjunction with the fingerprint evidence was sufficient to support a
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.353 In coming to this conclusion, the court made no mention of the detail, noted earlier in the court's
statement of facts, that the neighbor had "thought, but was not certain" of
his identification.3 54 Nor did the court address anywhere in its opinion the
palpable unreliability of the identification due to the fact that it was the
victim himself who had shown a single photograph to the neighbor
following the crime.
Turning to the petitioner's due process claim on the ground of stateintroduced perjury, the court cited the Agurs should have known /
reasonable likelihood standard, yet noted that the Second Circuit in Drake
355
had "declined to draw the contours of the phrase 'should have known."'
The court also noted that the Drake court had "decreed" that Sanders was
no longer effective precedent under the AEDPA, and that therefore a
habeas writ could not be granted "in the complete absence of prosecutorial
knowledge of perjury. 3 56
Addressing the facts of Grant,the court declared, quite incredibly and
seemingly without much conviction, "[i]t is not obvious that there was any
perjury by a prosecution witness: his characterization of the relationship

350.
Id. at *3.
351.
The court set forth the standard for a showing of insufficient evidence:
"Whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." Grant, 2003 WL 21847238, at *4 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)).
352.
Id.
353.
Id.
354.
Id. at *1.
355.
Id. (quoting Drake, 321 F.3d at 345).
356.
Id.
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might have been, in his own mind, accurate. 35 7 Alternatively, the court,
entertaining arguendo the falsity of Bailey's statement, and the possibility
"that petitioner ha[d] shown that the prosecutor had real or constructive
knowledge of the falsity," nonetheless asserted that "petitioner fail[ed] to
show that [the] falsity affected the jury's decision. 3 58 The court dismissed
the petitioner's argument that Bailey's alleged perjury was material. That
is, if the jury had known Bailey was lying about his relationship with the
petitioner, it might have believed that the fingerprint impression was made
on a social visit to Bailey's apartment. The court simply responded, "a
juror could nonetheless find that the fingerprint was left during the course
of the burglary. ' 359 The court concluded its analysis on the perjury/due
process claim by once again stating that there was other evidence besides
jury could have relied, namely the eyewitness
the fingerprint on which the
36
testimony of the neighbor. 0
The district court's analysis of the state-introduced perjury claim
seemed to turn the Agurs standard on its head. In the aftermath of the
Drake ruling, which left the Second Circuit bereft of both a clearly defined
"should have known" standard, as well as a clear materiality standard, the
district court seemed to be applying the same standard to both the
sufficiency of evidence and state-introduced perjury claims-namely, that
"a jury could find" that despite the perjury, the petitioner was still guilty.
The standard set forth in Agurs, however, and seemingly endorsed by the
that the
Second Circuit in Drake,36' was one of "any reasonable likelihood
"U ,,362
not
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury,
perjury.
the
did
despite
as
they
found
could
have
whether the jury
The Grant decision provides a textbook example of how the application of AEDPA to habeas claims leads not only to formalistic opinions and
analyses devoid of policy discussion but also decisions rendered under
fuzzy standards. Moreover, in Grant the central question of whether the
defendant received basic fairness at trial once again went unanswered.
This question could only have been answered by the court if it looked the

Grant, 2003 WL 21847238, at *5.
357.
Id.
358.
Id.
359.
Id.
360.
361.
The Second Circuit cited the "reasonable likelihood" standard twice in Drake,
without questioning its applicability, both in laying out the Agurs standard at the onset of its
analysis, Drake, 321 F.3d at 345, and in concluding, "[i]f Drake can successfully establish
that the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjured testimony, he may be able
to establish a 'reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury."' Id. at 346 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103).
Id. at 345 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103).
362.
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question of perjury squarely in the eye, and, based upon the available
evidence, came to a determination whether perjury occurred.
The evidence of perjury was extremely strong. Under its analysis of
the petitioner's additional third claim for ineffectiveness of counsel, the
court acknowledged that the petitioner had produced affidavits from both
Bailey's current landlord, and from Bailey's former landlord (also
petitioner's landlord when Bailey and the petitioner lived in the same
building) stating that the petitioner and Bailey "were close friends and that
petitioner frequently visited Bailey., 363 The court noted that Bailey's
current landlord even went so far as to aver "that petitioner was a 'constant
visitor' to Bailey's apartment." 364 The court, though rejecting the
petitioner's ineffectiveness claim under "the high standard enunciated in
Strickland,' 365 further acknowledged that the petitioner's attorney's
decision not to interview the landlord witnesses was "perhaps ill-advised in
hindsight." 366
Thus, there appears to be little doubt that, far from being a matter that
"might have been, in his own mind, accurate," Bailey's testimony that "he
hardly knew" the petitioner was simply a lie. As a matter of logic, the fact
that Bailey had a photo of the defendant close at hand and was eager to
show it to his neighbor made it exceedingly unlikely that "he hardly knew"
the defendant. Despite this obvious logic, the prosecution presented
Bailey's highly questionable testimony in conjunction with fingerprint
evidence, the relevance of which would have been seriously undermined by
truthful testimony that Bailey knew the defendant very well.
It is likely, then, that under either Sanders or a clearly-defined Agurs
standard, the petitioner in Grant would have had solid grounds for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. After Drake, however, it appears that
there are no clearly-defined federal constitutional restraints on state
prosecutors in the Second Circuit regarding the introduction of perjured
testimony. At least for now, it seems that those prosecutors who choose to
present highly improbable testimony that greatly bolsters their theory of a
case may do so without concern that a resulting conviction will be vacated
367
on AEDPA review.

363.
Grant,2003 WL 21847238, at *5.
364.
Id. (emphasis added).
365.
Id. at *6.
366.
Id.
367.
At the time of this article's publication, the Second Circuit issued an
unpublished decision affirming the district court's dismissal of Grant's habeas petition,
No. 03-2640-CV, 2005 WL 2460121 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2005), limited to review of
whether Grant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, the only issue granted a certificate of appealability by the district court. 2005
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the AEDPA, the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus, once "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action, 3 68 appears to be largely a thing of the past. The
notion that "the central mission of the Great Writ should be the substance
of 'justice,' not the form of procedures, 369 seems not only antiquated but
irrelevant after the amended habeas statute's passage and its subsequent
interpretation under the Supreme Court's Williams decision.
How hollowly the Warren Court's pre-AEDPA edicts must ring in the
ears of federal judges today! For example, what court could now claim: (1)
"[Habeas Corpus] is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy"; 370 or (2) "The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that
miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected"; 371 or (3)
"[W]e have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus
statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its
the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural
effectiveness with
372
requirements" ?

WL 2460121, at *1. In its two-page summary order, the Second Circuit did not address
Grant's state-introduced perjury claim. Id. at *1-2. The court, in addressing the
ineffective counsel claim, stated in regard to non-familial witnesses that Grant's
attorney did not call: "[Alithough their testimony, if believed, would have discredited
[the victim's] assertion that he and the petitioner had not socialized since 1989, it
would not have established that petitioner had been present in [the victim's] apartment
prior to the burglary. . . . these two witnesses were not able to testify as to the
petitioner's presence in [the victim's] new apartment prior to the burglary; thus, their
testimony was of limited usefulness in providing an innocent explanation for the
presence of the petitioner's fingerprint inside [the victim's] new apartment." Id.
Curiously, while the court added a fact that the district court chose to leave out, namely
that the victim claimed he had not socialized with Grant since 1989, the court omitted
the key fact that the lone fingerprint was found on the underside of a cable receiver in
the victim's new apartment-not, for example, on a cabinet, windowsill, wall, or other
permanent fixture of the apartment. The court also did not mention Grant's argument at
trial that the fingerprint could have been left on the receiver when it was in the old
apartment, or during the move to the new apartment, which he claimed he helped the
victim make. Thus the court's summary order was misleading in suggesting that Grant
had to prove he had been in the new apartment in order to explain the presence of the
lone fingerprint. In fact, one has to wonder why, if Grant did not wear gloves during
the burglary, he would not have left more than one print somewhere in the apartment.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
368.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 500 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
369.
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
370.
Harris, 394 U.S. at 291.
371.
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).
372.
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Sadly, there is not much "Great" about the "Writ" anymore, because
the federal habeas inquiry, even in the "liberal" Second Circuit, has largely
been reduced to a formalistic, even perfunctory exercise in federalist
deference. Section 2254(d) cases like Dallio and Drake demonstrate the
amended habeas statute's narrow and static focus on what the "clearly
established" law is, at the expense of reasoned and principled analyses of
what the body of constitutional law suggests, recommends, and calls for.
Though setting habeas precedents that no doubt will impact the conduct of
future state trials, Second Circuit judges seem to be like spectators
watching their own decisions unfold- whether they are reluctantly
denying relief on habeas review when they "might well have" granted relief
on direct appeal, or mechanically carrying out the dictates of § 2254 with
surgical dispatch.
Dissenting in Brown v. Allen, Justice Black endorsed "the principle
that it is never too late for courts in habeas corpus proceedings to look
straight through procedural screens in order to prevent forfeiture of life or
liberty in flagrant defiance of the Constitution., 373 Unfortunately, in this
era in which we have become aware that substantial numbers of defendants
are being wrongly convicted in state courts, the habeas inquiry itself
functions as a rigid "procedural screen," and the federal courts rarely look
beyond that screen to the substantive issues of whether a petitioner was
accorded justice under our nation's Constitution.

373.

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).

